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L Introduction

There are some things money can't buy. State antitakeover statutes
help achieve this result by protecting local corporations from perceived
hostile predators.' Yet in taking such actions, states may not only violate
sound economic policy,2 but they may also run afoul of the Constitution's
goal of maintaining interstate comity, a value embodied in Article I's
Commerce Clause. The United States Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
1. See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text (discussing policies behind takeover
legislation).
2. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 500 & n.5
(7th Cir.) (questioning economic wisdom of antitakeover legislation), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
955 (1989). Examining tender offers from an equity investor's perspective in Amanda
Acquisition, Judge Easterbrook expressed concerns about antitakeover laws, including
entrenchment of an inefficient management, id. at 500, declining profits and depressed stock
prices after defeating a bid, id. at 501, and destruction of flexibility in a firm's ability to
choose between different methods of dealing with a tender offer, id. at 501-02.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that "Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States"); cf. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MicH.
L. REv. 1091, 1113 (1986) (positing three objections to state protectionism in general).
Professor Regan's three objections comprise a "concept-of-union" objection, a "resentment/retaliation" objection, and an "efficiency" objection. Id. The concept-of-union
objection renders state protectionism unacceptable because it is hostile, or inconsistent with
the idea of political union. Id. Regan bases his second objection on the premise that state
protectionism leads to a cycle of animosity and isolation that again threatens the political
union. Id. at 1114. Finally, Regan claims that protectionism leads to inefficiency, defined
as "divert[ing] business away from presumptively low-cost producers without any colorable
justification in terms of a benefit that deserves approval from the.., nation as a whole." Id.
at 1118.
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decisions on antitakeover statutes have tried to accommodate these
competing values.4 Just when the Court has struck a balance, however, a
new case arrives to skew the old equations.
Until 1994, when the Court decided West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v
Healy,' thwarted tender offerors had invoked the Commerce Clause to challenge antitakeover legislation contained only in single statutes.6 Yet
takeover targets can increasingly draw on multiple statutes to formulate
defensive strategies. 7 West Lynn Creamery adds another twist to these,
situations with its holding that a two-part law may violate the Commerce'
Clause despite the constitutionality of its individual components.' The West
Lynn Creamery Court reached this decision by assuming a functionalist
approach, looking at the scheme's overall practical effect rather than testing
separately its discrete, formal provisions.9 Although this methodology
answered the specific problem raised in West Lynn Creamery, the decision
failed to address concerns regarding how and when to apply the new rule.'0
Even more importantly, West Lynn Creamery increased the divergence
between the Supreme Court's analysis in past Commerce Clause cases
involving antitakeover laws and m recent cases involving other types of
commodities." This growing schism raises fundamental questions about
the nature of corporations and the proper roles of courts and legislatures in
governing them.' 2 These problems came home to roost in WLR Foods, Inc.
v Tyson Foods, Inc."3

4. See infra part III.B (providing background on Supreme Court's antitakeover law
decisions).
5. 144 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
6. See mfra note 124 (discussing how in past courts have dealt with antitakeover laws
individually).
7 See source cited infra note 106 (specifying number of states with multiple
antitakeover statutes as of 1993).
8. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214-15 (1994).
9. See id. at 2215 (stating that Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is not
controlled by form by which state erects barriers to commerce but rather eschews formalism
for "sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects").
10. See infra text accompanying note 64 (introducing problems that extension of West
Lynn Creamery's rule would entail).
11. See discussion infra part IV.C.3 (tracing split in Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence).
12. See infra notes 202-23, 229 and accompanying text (examining these issues).
13. 861 F Supp. 1277 (W.D. Va. 1994).
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11. Focusing West Lynn Creamery

A. WLR Foods and West Lynn Creamery Background
When one of America's most aggressive takeover players faced fierce
opposition from a group of Shenandoah Valley poultry growers, the battle
surprised many in the financial world, including the tender offeror. 4
Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) 5 eventually failed in its bid to acquire WLR
Foods, Inc. (WLR),' 6 largely because of WLR's effective use of three

Virginia antitakeover statutes and Virginia's lenient statutory director
conduct standard.17 In its courtroom challenge to WLR's actions, Tyson
14. See Jerry Knight, A High-Stakes Game of Chicken - Wall Street's Fowl Play: The
Bitter MergerFight of Tyson and WLR Foods, WASH. POST, May 16, 1994, at F1 (stating that
Wall Street has never seen "the likes" of Tyson and WLR's takeover fight); David Ress,
Rulings Could Mean Virginia is For Corporations:Interpretationof Law Gives Boards of
DirectorsBroad Powers, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 4, 1994, at El (referring to
Wall Street's "stunned" reaction to growers' resistance). Tyson's bid offered WLR stock
owners $30 a share, which exceeded the market rate by nearly $11 a share. Pat Murphey,
An Offer They CouldRefuse - WLR Began Defying Tyson and the Odds a Year Ago, DAILY
NEWS-RECORD (Harrisonburg, Virginia), Jan. 24, 1995, at 13.
15. Tyson, based in Springdale, Arkansas, is America's largest poultry company
Knight, supra note 14, at Fl. According to one source, Don Tyson, Tyson's chairman, has
a dream of building America's only meat conglomerate. Id. Another reporter wrote that
Tyson already has chicken, beef, pork, lamb, and seafood facilities; turkey is the one thing
it lacks. Murphey, supra note 14, at 14.
16. In 1994, before its acquisition of Cuddy Farms' turkey operations in North
Carolina, WLR was the third-largest turkey producer in the United States. Knight, supra
note 14, at Fl. The "W" in the WLR acronym stands for Wampler, a family long involved
in the poultry industry and now owning more than 10% of WLR. Id. The "L" is for
Longacre, a family that merged its poultry business with the Wamplers' but has since sold
its WLR stock. Id. The "R" is for the Rockingham County Poultry Cooperative, a nonprofit
chicken processor owned by poultry growers that joined Wampler-Longacre in 1988. Id.
The 1988 merger with Wampler-Longacre left about one-third of WLR's stock in the
growers' hands. Id.
17 See Jerry Knight, Tyson's WLR Takeover Is Cooked - Poultry GiantBows Out in
Face of Virginia Competitor'sManeuvers, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1994, at B1 (stating that
WLR's legal and financial maneuvers made company "all but impossible to swallow").
Tyson's retreat reportedly produced "jubilation" in the Shenandoah Valley, where WLR is
the largest employer and where poultry is the most important farm product. Id. The asserted
deciding factor was WLR's acquisition of a North Carolina turkey company, which would
give WLR insiders "enough shares to control WLR's board of directors even if Tyson Foods
b[ought] all other shares." Id. However, Virginia's antitakeover law is "one of the reasons
why Tyson's Shenandoah Valley campaign turned into one of the worst defeats since the
locals routed the Yankees at the battle of New Market, which is just a few miles up the road
from WLR's headquarters in Broadway " Jerry Knight, Washington Investing - Main Street
Beats Wall Street in FailedTyson Deal, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1994, at F25.
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asserted that the four Virginia statutes operate as a scheme that unconstitutionally impedes hostile takeovers in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause."8 Tyson claimed further that even if each Virginia statute is
constitutional, the scheme as a whole could still be unconstitutional. 9 In
a memorandum opinion accompanying a preliminary order m the case,
Judge Michael, of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Virgua, found that the Virginia statutes would probably pass constitutional
muster.2" Yet he also stated that dicta in a recent United States Supreme
Court case could support the theory, if not the merits, of Tyson's argument. 2 '
The case to which Judge Michael referred was West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v Healy.' In West Lynn Creamery, the Supreme Court decided
whether a two-part Massachusetts regulation - one part imposing a surcharge on all milk sold by dealers to retailers in the state, and the other part
distributing the surcharge's proceeds to Massachusetts milk producers discri nated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce
Clause.23 Massachusetts legislators supported the pricing order as a
measure to bolster the state's ailing dairy industry 24 Challenging the order
were dealers who had purchased out-of-state milk for sale to retailers in
Massachusetts and who had lost their licenses after refusing to pay the
prescribed premiumsY In reaching its decision, the Court compared the
practical effect of the Massachusetts pricing order to protective tanffs,
which the Court said it has long held to violate the Commerce Clause.
18. WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va.
1994). Judge James H. Michael, Jr., who presided over the proceedings, apparently planned
to scrutinize carefully Virginia's antitakeover law. He said he intended to "pick this statute
up like you'd pick up a mouse by the tail and look at it." Jerry Kmght, Tyson Criticizes
Virginia Takeover Law, WASH. POST, July 8, 1994, at F3. Because a decision invalidating
Virginia's law could potentially affect numerous Virginia companies, the state attorney
general intervened to defend the statutes. Id.
19. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1281.
20. Id. at 1289.
21. Id. at 1282.
22. 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
23. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, 114'S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
24. Id. at 2209-10.
25. Id. at 2209, 2210.
26. See id. at 2211 (describing protective tariffs and states' attempts to reap tariffs'

benefits by other means). Illustrative cases invalidating statutes with tariff-like effects include
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (striking down law granting tax exemption to certain liquors produced in Hawaii); Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising
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According to the Court, the Massachusetts order produced a tariff-like
effect because the subsidy more than offset the tax's burden on Massachusetts dairy farmers." As a result, the Court concluded that the subsidy
discriminated against interstate commerce by strengthening the Massachusetts farmers' competitive position at the expense of out-of-state producers
and their dealers.28
The West Lynn Creamery Court rejected the state's four counterbalancing arguments justifying this discriminatory effect. The Court first acknowledged that the Constitution permits both nondiscriminatory taxes and
subsidies as exercises of state power when considered individually 29 The
Court, however, cautioned that one could not presume the laws' validity
from their individual constitutionality because when considered together
they formed a scheme removing safeguards against legislative abuse.30
Even though the tax evenhandedly affected in-state and out-of-state interests, the subsidy mollified the in-state group, who would otherwise lobby
the state legislature against the tax.31 The Court explained further that, although the tax fell on dealers in out-of-state milk and not on out-of-state
producers (who were the Massachusetts dairy farmers' direct competitors),
the Commerce Clause protects against imposition of a differential burden
on any part of the stream of commerce because a burden placed at any
point eventually disadvantages the producer.32 The Court then cited traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence in dismissing the state's argument
that no discrnmunation occurred because in-state consumers, not out-of-state
interests, bore the brunt of the tax's cost.33 Stating that preservation of
local industry does not sufficiently outweigh the Commerce Clause's prohibition against economic protectionism, the Court also refused to accept
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (striking down North Carolina regulation requiring that all
apples shipped or sold in state in closed containers be marked with federal grade or with
designation that apples were not graded); and Baldwin v G.A.F Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935) (striking down minimum price order for all milk sold in Vermont).
27 West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2212.
28. Id.
29 Id. at 2214.
30. Id. at 2215. "By conjoining a tax and a subsidy," the Court opined, "Massachusetts
has created a program more dangerous to interstate commerce than either part alone." Id.
at 2214-15.
31. Id. at 2215.
32. Id. at 2216.
33. See id. at 2216-17 (stating that Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272
(1984), thoroughly repudiates this contention).
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that the statutes were necessary to the

continued vitality of the Massachusetts dairy industry I The West Lynn
Creamery Court thus held that the Massachusetts statutes violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce without sufficient justification."
WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc.36 presents the first application
of West Lynn Creamery's rationale to corporate takeover statutes. In WLR
Foods, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied
a preliminary injunction to support Tyson's constitutional challenge of four
Virgmna statutes affecting its takeover bid for WLR.37 The specific issues
facing the court were whether the Williams Act3 preempts the Virginia
statutes and whether the Virginia statutes violate the Commerce Clause.39
The four statutes involved were Virginia's Control Share Acquisitions Act
(Control Share Act),' Affiliated Transactions Act," section 646 (Poison
Pill Statute),42 and section 690 (Business Judgment Statute).43
The court noted first that dicta in West Lynn Creamery could support

Tyson's assertion that a statutory scheme could be invalid even if each of
its components is constitutional." In West Lynn Creamery, the Supreme
34. Id. at 2217
35. Id. at 2209.
36. 861 F Supp. 1277 (W.D. Va. 1994).
37 WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277 (W.D. Va. 1994).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988). Implementation of the Williams Act
in 1968 preempted, interestingly enough, Virginia's four-month-old Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (Michle 1973) (repealed). Mary H. Ackerly
& Wade M. Fricke, Note, "May We Have the Last Dance?"- States Take Aim at Corporate
Raiders and.Crash the Predator'sBall, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv 1059, 1059 (1988). Virginia's short-lived disclosure act was the first statute regulating tender offers in the country
Id. It required a person acquiring a controlling interest m a target corporation to disclose
certain information to shareholders. Id. The Act also attempted to regulate other aspects of
takeover bids, including a bid's duration. Id. at 1059 n. 1.
39. WLIR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1279.
40. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Michie 1993); see also infra note 109
(discussing Control Share Act).
41. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -727.1 (Michie 1993); see also infra note 110
(discussing Affiliated Transactions Act).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646 (Michie 1993); see also infra note 111 (discussing
Poison Pill Statute).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Michie 1993); see also infra note 112 (discussing
Business Judgment Statute).
44. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp at 1282.
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Court had included in its Commerce Clause analysis dicta about the Court's
general perspective on Commerce Clause cases.45 The West Lynn Creamery Court stated, "Our Commerce Clause jurisprudence is not so rigid as
to be controlled by the form by which a State erects bars to commerce.

Rather, our cases have eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case
analysis of purposes and effects." 4 6 Quoting from Best & Co. v Maxwell,47

the Supreme Court reiterated: "The [C]ommerce [C]lause forbids discnmination, whether forthright or ingemous. In each case it is our duty to
determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will
in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce. "" Relying on this functional approach, the West Lynn Creamery
Court concluded that statutes may operate as an unconstitutional scheme
even though they are individually constitutional.4 9 In WLR Foods, the court

assumed, without deciding, that West Lynn Creamery's rationale extends
to statutes a legislature has not purposefully linked,50 unlike West Lynn
Creamery's explicitly integrated regulations.
Addressing the merits, the WLR Foods court concluded that the Wil-

liams Act does not preempt the Virgmia laws because the statutes do not
favor management or the tender offerors over investors and thus do not
interfere with the federal statute's objective of protecting investors by
ensuring an informed decision regarding any tender offer for their shares. 5
The court then decided that the Virgima statutes do not offend the Com45. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2215-16 (1994)
(expressing Court's perspective on Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
46. Id. at 2215.
47 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
48. WestLynn Creamery, 114S. Ct. at2215-16; Maryland v Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
756 (1981); Exxon Corp. v Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 147 (1978); Best & Co.
v Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455 (1940). In Best, the Supreme Court considered whether a
North Carolina statute violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 455. The statute levied an
annual license tax on out-of-state merchants who rented North Carolina hotel rooms to display
samples for sales purposes. Id. The Court first assumed that North Carolina residents
competing with the out-of-state merchants would normally be regular North Carolina retail
merchants, who avoided the levy Id. at 456. The Court then reasoned that the statute
discriminated against interstate commerce because North Carolina required the tax of out-ofstate retailers but not of their local competitors. Id. at 456-57 Consequently, the Court held
the tax unconstitutional. Id. at 457
49. See West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2215 (stating that use of constitutional
means cannot guarantee constitutionality of program as whole).
50. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1283.
51. Id. at 1286.
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merce Clause for two reasons." First, the court found that the Virginia
statutes do not discriminate against out-of-state tender offerors because the
laws apply evenhandedly and do not completely eliminate the interstate
commerce flow m hostile takeovers of Virginia corporations.53 Second, the
court found that the Virginia statutes satisfy the balancing test established.
by the Supreme Court m Pike v Bruce Church, Inc.54 because states may
neutralize any potential harm that hostile takeovers may cause the corporations that states create and define.55 Such a scheme passes constitutional
muster, even though its regulation incidentally affects interstate commerce." The court therefore concluded that the Virgima statutes, even
viewed as a scheme, should survive both Williams Act and Commerce
Clause attacks.57

B. Initial Concerns About Applying West Lynn Creamery
to NonintegratedTakeover Legislation
Despite hIs assumption m WLR Foods that West Lynn Creamery applies
beyond an integrated statutory program, Judge Michael expressed concerns
over actually doing so.58 He stated that this extension would create "enormous" difficulties in application for district courts.59 According to Judge
Michael, the West Lynn Creamery Court could invalidate the two-part milk
pricing order because Massachusetts never intended either component of
the order to stand alone.' ° Problems occur, said Judge Michael, when
52. Id. at 1287-89.
53. Id. at 1287-88.

54. See id. at 1288 (describing Pike test). Under the test enunciated in Pike v Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), statutes violate the Commerce Clause if they impose a

burden on interstate commerce that clearly exceeds their putative local benefits. Id. at 142;
see also infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing Pike test).
55. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1289

56. Id.
57 Id. Because the court was merely deciding Tyson's motion for a preliminary
injunction, Judge Michael did not determine whether Tyson would actually succeed on the

merits of its claims but only whether Tyson was likely to succeed on them at trial. See id. at
1281 (indicating that likelihood of success on merits would determine court's grant of preliminary injunction). The court later fixed these conclusions m the final judgment and order, in

the case. WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 869 F Supp. 419 (W.D. Va. 1994).
58. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1283.
59. Id. at 1282.
60. Id.
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separately constitutional statutes that a legislature did not purposely conjoin
operate together to create a scheme that is unconstitutional as a whole.
Because these nonintegrated statutes often serve more than one purpose,
courts cannot simply strike down the statutes themselves.62 The situation
would instead force courts to distinguish between particular constitutional
and unconstitutional uses of the statutes.63 Judge Michael concretely illustrated this predicament in the following series of rhetorical questions and
hypotheticals:
[W]hat is the particular unconstitutional way m which the Virginia
statutes were used [by WLR]? At what point did WLR enter the
realm of unconstitutionality9 Was it when they approved the poison
pill? Was it when they called for a control share referendum? Does
it matter whether they understood the implications of the Affiliated
Transactions Act when they took action? Could they approve a
poison pill if they opt out of the Control Share Act? Could they utilize the Control Share Act if they do not adopt a poison pill?
If
the collective statutes were used unconstitutionally, what part should
be enjoined? Perhaps the management could be given a choice either redeem the poison pill or opt out of the Control Share
Act.
Perhaps management could be precluded from utilizing the
Control Share Act or adopting a poison pill anytime the Affiliated
Transactions Act applies. The Affiliated Transactions Act applies,
however, every time that the Control Share Act applies because of
the ownership percentage requirements that trigger each statute.
This would mean that management would always be precluded from
using the Control Share Act, which as a practical matter is the same
as declaring the Control Share Act unconstitutional.'
Judge Michael's musings demonstrate the practical hazards of applying
West Lynn Creamery's Commerce Clause analysis to multistatute antitakeover schemes. Underlying doctrinal difficulties also exist. 65 To understand
best where the Court might be going on this issue, however, one must
understand first from where the Court came.

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1282-83.

65. See discussion infra part IV.C.3 (pointing out doctrinal difficulties existing m
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
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IlI. Background on DormantCommerce Clauseand Its Application
to State Takeover Legislation

A. Donnant Commerce Clause Generally
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to govern interstate commerce. 66 Even though the Commerce Clause does not explicitly restrict
state regulation when Congress has not acted,67 the Supreme Court has
stricken a myriad of regulations in such instances.68 This construction is
known as the Commerce Clause's "dormant, 69 or "negative"70 aspect. The
Court's interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause, as inherently
limiting state activity even absent congressional action, developed over a
140-year span.7 1
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power to regulate commerce
among states).

67 Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Marketfor CorporateControl: State Take
Over Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. &MARY L. REV 699, 743 (1988).
68. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V Nugent, The DormantCommerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 574-75 (listing as examples
invalidations of state licensing requirements, train length restrictions, mudguard requirements, truck length prohibitions, and various produce regulations). In their article, Professors Redish and Nugent actually argue against the dormant Commerce Clause's validity Id.
at 573. According to Redish and Nugent, the doctrine upsets the Constitution's inherent
balance of power. Id. They categorize the Commerce Clause as one of the constitutional
provisions that allocates legislative control to the states unless Congress preempts or overrules
the particular state action. Id. at 591. The authors claim that the dormant Commerce Clause
upsets this balance by imposing a judge-made barrier to state regulation of interstate commerce that only affirmative congressional action can overcome. Id. at 592. Their second
reason for the asserted invalidity of the dormant Commerce Clause is that the doctrine thwarts
the advantages of a federal system, such as individual state experimentation. Id. at 574.
69. See Pinto, supra note 67, at 705 (describing so-called "dormant" Commerce
Clause).
70. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (1994) (quoting
language denoting."negative" aspect of Commerce Clause). In a footnote, the West Lynn
CreameryCourt stated that James Madison, the Constitution's author, considered the negative
aspect of the Commerce Clause more important than the positive one. Id. at 2211 n.9
Madison wrote in a letter that the Commerce Clause "grew out of the abuse of the power by
the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and
preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to
be used for the positive purposes of the General Government." Id. (quoting M. FARRAND,
3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 478 (1911)).
71. See CrS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 87 (1987) (citing Cooley
v Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852), as authority for proposition that
dormant Commerce Clause theory has been settled for over a century); Edgar v MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (quoting language from Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v
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Professor Arthur Pinto writes that in analyzing dormant Commerce
Clause cases, the Supreme Court first distinguishes between direct and indirect state regulation.' The Court strikes down laws if they regulate commerce directly, discriminate against interstate commerce, or favor rn-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests.73 By contrast, the Court draws
on a balancing test developed in Pike v Bruce Church, Inc.74 to evaluate
indirect and nondiscriminatory statutes. 75 Under the Pike test, a statute is
constitutional when "[it] regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest[ ] and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits."76
B. Application ofDormant Commerce Clause to
State Takeover Legislation
1 Edgar v MITE Corp.
In Edgar v MITE Corp. ,' the first major takeover legislation case of
the 1980s, the Supreme Court used the Pike test to strike down an Illinois
statute designed to discourage hostile takeovers.78 The Court's plurality
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976), claiming that Commerce Clause's implicit limitation
has been clear at least since Cooley).
72. Pinto, supra note 67, at 705.
73. Id. Professor Pinto also includes Professor Laurence Tribe's argument that the
direct-indirect distinction is conclusory and misleading and that the Supreme Court will
uphold even a direct regulation if it is rationally related to a legitimate state end and satisfies
the Pike test. Id. at 705 n.23. Pinto writes, however, that the Court recognizes the difficulties but still uses the distinction. Id., see Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v New York
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (recognizing that no clear line separates direct
regulation, which is virtually per se unconstitutional, from indirect regulation, which is subject to Pike test).
74. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
75. See Pinto, supra note 67, at 705 (describing, but not naming, Pike test).
76. Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). In Pike, a grower of cantaloupes sought to enjoin enforcement of an Arizona statute requiring that all Arizona-grown
cantaloupes be packed and processed in the state. Id. at 138-39. The state's goal was to identify the superior melons as originating in Arizona, thereby enhancing the reputation of local
cantaloupe growers. Id. at 144. Compliance would have required the grower to build an
unneeded $200,000 packing plant. Id. at 145. The Court rejected Arizona's asserted interest
as insufficient to justify this burden on interstate commerce. Id. The Court accordingly
affirmed the lower court's judgment striking down the Arizona statute. Id. at 146.
77 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
78. Edgar v MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). The Illinois Business Take-Over
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opinion rejected assertions that the state regulation served legitimate state
interests by protecting resident shareholders79 and by merely regulating
internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law o After weighing these interests against the substantial effects of the asserted ability of the
Illinois Secretary of State to block a tender offer anywhere in the country, 8'
the M/TE majority concluded that the statute's burden on interstate commerce overshadowed its putative local benefits.' The Court accordingly

held the Illinois Act invalid under the Commerce Clause.83

Act required tender offerors to notify the Illinois Secretary of State and the target company
of any impending offer 20 days before the offer's effective date and to register the offer with
the Secretary of State. Id. at 626-27 The statute also purportedly vested the Secretary with
power to hold a hearing and to enjoin nationwide any offer deemed unfair. Id. at 627, 643.
The statute applied to attempted takeovers of corporations of which 10% of the class of equity
securities subject to the offer belonged to Illinois shareholders or of corporations meeting two
of three criteria: location of the corporation's principal executive office in Illinois, organization under Illinois law, or representation of at least 10% of the corporation's stated capital
and paid-in surplus within Illinois. Id. at 627 Professor Pinto describes the Illinois statute
as typical of "first generation" takeover statutes, which are the first type of statutes state
legislators enacted to enable corporate management to defend against unwanted takeover bids.
Pinto, supra note 67, at 704.
79. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 644-45 (reasoning that statute reached nonresident
shareholders whom state had no interest in protecting and that even in-state shareholders
received similar protection from federal Williams Act).
80. See td. at 645 (reasoning that statute permitted decisions regarding corporations
incorporated in other states and with no principal place of business in Illinois and that
transfers of stock by shareholders to third parties generally do not implicate internal affairs
doctrine). The M!TE Court defined the internal affairs as a conflict of laws principle
recognizing that only one state's laws should regulate matters peculiar to relationships
between a corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders to avoid placing
conflicting demands on the corporation. Id.
81. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 643 (finding that Secretary's power deprived shareholders
of opportunity to sell stock at premium, hindered reallocation of resources to their highest
valued use, and reduced incentive that tender offer mechanism provides incumbent
management to keep stock prices high through performing well). But cf. Randall Morck et
al., Characteristicsof Targets of Hostile and Fnendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101-02 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (stating that, although
hostile takeovers often seek to correct "non-value-maximizing" practices of target firm
management, diversification-motivated takeovers may meet resistance as well).
82. MiTE, 457 U.S. at 646. The plurality also concluded that, in addition to failing the
Pike balancing test, the Illinois Act violated the Commerce Clause by directly regulating and
preventing interstate takeovers that in turn generate interstate transactions. Id. at 640.
Justice Powell joined only the Court's Commerce Clause analysis under the Pike balancing
test because it left room for state regulation of takeovers. Id. at 646.
83. Id. at 643, 646. Three Justices dissented on the ground that the case was moot.
Id. at 655, 664.
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2. CTS Corp. v Dynanucs Corp. of America

In 1987, the Supreme Court again addressed the constitutionality of
4
state takeover legislation in CTS Corp v Dynamics Corp. of Amenca.
CTS involved Indiana's Control Share Acquisitions Chapter, which required
a majority vote of all disinterested shareholdersu before an entity acquiring
20%, 331/3%, or 50% of an Indiana corporation's shares could acquire its
corresponding voting rights.8 6 According to the Court, this act had the

practical effect of conditioning a tender offeror's acquisition of control of a
corporation on the approval of a majority of pre-existing disinterested shareholders."
In determining that the Indiana act was constitutional, the CTS Court
observed that the legislation applied evenhandedly to interstate and local
businesses and thus did not discrimmate against out-of-state offers. 8 The
Court also found that the statute did not inconsistently regulate corporations
because the statute applied only to Indiana-created corporations.8 9 The Court

then noted that, in regulating corporations, states merely exercise control
over entities whose very existence and attributes are products of state law 90

Indiana thus had a substantial interest in protecting the voting autonomy of
resident shareholders in corporations incorporated in Indiana.9" Finally, the
Court dismissed the argument that the law was unconstitutional because the
84. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
85. The statute defined "interested shares" as shares enabling an acquiror, officer, or
inside director of the corporation to vote in the election of directors. CTS Corp. v Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 73 n.2 (1987).
86. Id. at 73 (1987). Professor Pinto places control share statutes in the second
generation of state takeover regulations, which attempted to avoid the characteristics that
proved constitutionally fatal in M!TE. Pinto, supra note 67, at 709 Second-generation
takeover statutes affect the process of the takeover. Id. The part of the process affected in
CS was the tender offeror's power to influence the target corporation through exercising its
voting rights.
87 CTS, 481 U.S. at 74.
88. Id. at 87 That the Indiana statute would most often affect out-of-state entities
did not sway the CTS Court because the Supreme Court in an earlier case had declared that
"[this] fact
does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate
commerce." See id. at 88 (quoting Exxon Corp. v Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
126 (1978)).
89 CTS, 481 U.S. at 88-89.
90. Id. at 89
91. Id. at 93. According to the Court, the CTS situation differed from MiTE m that
only corporations incorporated in Indiana and having a substantial number of rn-state
shareholders qualified for protection. Id.
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law limited the number of successful takeovers. 2 The Court reasoned that
states have the freedom to define the entities they create, as long as residents
and nonresidents have equal access to any market for control of these
entities.93 The Court therefore held that Indiana's Control Share Acquisitions Chapter did not violate the Commerce Clause. 4

3. Post-CTS
After CTS, states that had enacted statutes designed to survive MITE

challenges could breathe a partial sigh of relief because the Supreme Court
had approved at least one type of takeover regulation.95 Although the

Supreme Court never repudiated MITE's invalidation of a state's direct,
governmental regulation of tender offers, CTS left room for less direct
regulation.96 In terms of policy, the CTS decision retreated from M!TE's
92. Id. at 93-94.
93. Id. at 94.
94. See id. at 87, 94 (addressing holding of court of appeals that Indiana act violated
Commerce Clause and reversing that judgment).
95. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (describing how Supreme Court
approved control share act in CM).
96. These regulations include Professor Pinto's so-called second, third, and fourth
generation. Pinto's classification of state takeover legislation comprises several, roughly
chronological groups of statutes. He places pre-M/TE statutes m the first generation. Pinto,
supra note 67, at 709. Post-MITE, pre-CTS statutes constitute the second generation. Id. at
709 These statutes affect the tender offer process and follow a variety of models: shareholder approval (the model challenged m CMS), second tier (guaranteeing shareholders either
a supermajority vote or a fair price on nontendered shares after the tender offeror's initial
offer but before a newly controlling offeror can freeze out the nontendering shareholders'
equity positions), share redemption (compelling acquiror of certain percentage of shares to
buyout remaining shares at a fair price), fiduciary duty (expanding the fiduciary concept to
allow a corporation's board of directors to legitimately implement defenses to takeovers that
may negatively affect the corporation's constituents other than shareholders, including the
corporation's employees, customers, and community), and full disclosure (requiring offeror
to give shareholders within the enacting state a variety of information regarding the offer).
Id. at 709-13; see also Arthur R. Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause
and State CorporateLaw, 41 U. MAMI L. REv 473, 478-83 (1987) (describing various
statutory models). The third generation includes the voting rights and business combination
models. Pinto, supra note 67, at 713. The former model demands a majority vote of
disinterested shareholders before an entity acquiring a certain percentage of shares can obtain
voting rights. Id. The latter requires board approval before the shareholder can acquire
additional shares over a specific threshold or for proposed business combinations with the
shareholder. Id. Pinto's fourth and final generation classification encompasses statutes that
protect corporations not incorporated in a state but having a substantial nexus with the state.
Id. at 714. According to Pinto, the fourth-generation statutes were legislative responses to
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refusal to acknowledge any legitimate state interest m protecting nonresident
shareholders and from M!TE's emphasis on freeing the market for corporate
control.' The CTS Court instead focused on allowing states "in which [a]
corporation is incorporated [to] play a role in protecting investors in the
tender offer context" and on reinforcing the internal affairs doctrine. 98 The
Court stressed a "state's power to enact corporate laws governing resident
corporations even though those laws could interfere with tender offers and
interstate commerce."99
Yet the Supreme Court's resolution of CTS also raised new Commerce
Clause questions. For example, the CTS Court never expressly mentioned
the Pike test or even cited the Pike case m its Commerce Clause analysis."°
This omission has led some courts and commentators to argue that the Supreme Court has rejected the Pike balancing test.' Others claim, however,
that the Court has not abandoned the Pike test.'02 Perhaps most significantly,
CTS's two policy motivations potentially conflict m certain situations. "3' By
possible takeovers of corporations significant to the state. Id. Presence within the state of
a principal place of business or executive offices, substantial number of assets, and shareholders and employees often satisfies the nexus requirement. Id.
97 Id. at 722-23.
98. Id. at 724.
99. Id.
100. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: () CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America
and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctnne; (II) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MICH.
L. REV 1865, 1867 (1987).
101. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v Universal Foods, 877 F.2d 496, 507 (7th
Cir.) (asserting that states may regulate corporate transactions without having to demonstrate
that benefits outweigh consequences under unfocused balancing test), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
955 (1989); Hyde Park Partners, L.P v Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 844 (1st Cir. 1988)
(stating that balancing test appears abandoned when state law merely regulates intrastate
corporation governance but not when legislative purpose extends beyond intrastate concerns);
Regan, supra note 100, at 1869 (claiming that Court has replaced balancing with discrimination analysis). In an article predating CTS, Regan argues that the Court should be concerned
exclusively with preventing purposeful economic protectionism and not with balancing in
"movement-of-goods" Commerce Clause cases. Regan, supra note 3, at 1092-93. Regan
defines movement-of-goods cases in the negative as all cases except those involving
instruments of interstate transportation, taxation of interstate commerce, or the state as market
participant. Id. at 1098-99. Regan claims that despite what the Court says it has been doing,
it has not been balancing. Id. at 1092.
102. Pinto, supra note 67, at 746; see WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F
Supp. 1277, 1288 (W.D. Va. 1994) (indicating that CTS Court implicitly invoked logic of
Pike without explicitly naming Pike test).
103. See Pinto, supra note 67, at 746 (illustrating situations involving potential policy
clashes by posing hypotheticals in which state corporate law found unprotective of investors
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failing to reconcile - much less acknowledge - this rift, the Court left
unsettled questions about the validity of antitakeover laws designed to protect
nonshareholder interests. 1 04
With its sweeping dicta, West Lynn Creamery may only increase the
confusion that CTS engendered. M!TE and CTS both addressed single
takeover statutes, but corporations increasingly draw on several laws to fend
off hostile tender offers. 0" Although the statutes may pass constitutional
muster individually under CTS (setting aside the issue of whether Pike or any
other test is still a valid means of evaluating laws), West Lynn Creamery
presents a basis for arguing that a corporation's union of defenses forms an
unconstitutional scheme. Of course, one may recognize that CTS establishes
an increased acceptance of state regulation of tender offers and that West
Lynn Creamery is not factually a tender offer case. These points, however,
do not establish that West Lynn Creamery will never play a role in striking
down state takeover legislation. The next Part of this Note examines further
the interplay between the Supreme Court's past approach to single takeover
statutes and what West Lynn Creamery might mean for multistatute schemes
in the future.
IV Application of West Lynn Creamery to State Takeover Legislation
As Viewed Through the Lens of WLR Foods
WestLynn Creamery could signal a departure from the Supreme Court's
tolerant position in CTS when applied to corporations that draw on multiple
statutes to create takeover defenses. If courts adopt West Lynn Creamery's
reasoning even in situations involving nonintegrated legislation, many takeover statutes will be vulnerable to a new form of constitutional attack." ° In
or designed to protect other corporate interests such as employees or in which state other than

state of incorporation attempts to protect investors or other interests).
104. Cf. Lyman Johnson & David Milon, Missing the Point About State Takeover
Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REv 846, 856 (1989) (pointing to troubling constitutional questions
regarding takeover legislation and stating that difficult questions of fact, policy, and doctrine
are only beginning to receive deserved attention).
105. See infra note 106 (citing study on number of states with multistatute antitakeover
schemes as of 1993).
106. Q. Memorandum in Opposition to Tyson's Attack on the Constitutionality of Four
Virginia Statutes at 44 & n.10, WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277
(W.D. Va. 1994) (No. 94-012-H) [hereinafter WLR Memorandum] (referring to study
describing number of states with multistatute antitakeover schemes). As of 1993, 21 states
had both control share and affiliated transaction statutes, and 10 had control share, affiliated
transaction, and poison pill statutes. Id. (citing INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH
CENTER, STATE TAKEOVER LAws (1993)).
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choosing this path, however, the courts would march toward increasing
antitakeover law chaos, both practical and doctrnal.1°7 Closer exammation
of the statutes and issues in WLR Foods provides a case study in these
difficulties.
Tyson's challenge to WLR's takeover defense strategy implicated
four Virginia statutes. 08 Three of the statutes provide methods for blocking the takeover: the Control Share Act, the Affiliated Transactions Act, 10
107 See discussion infra parts IV.A-D (exainumng these issues).
108. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1279-80 (W.D. Va.
1994).
109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Michie 1993). Virginia's Control Share
Acquisitions Act requires shareholder approval before persons acquiring enough shares to
control (1) one-fifth to one-third, (2) one-third to less than a majority, or (3) a majority or more
of a corporation's voting power can exercise their voting rights. Id. §§ 13.1-7281.1, -728.3.
Section 13.1-728.3 describes the approval procedure:
A. Notwithstanding any contrary provision of this chapter, shares acquired in a
control share acquisition have no voting rights unless voting rights are granted by
resolution adopted by the shareholders of the issuing public corporation. If such a
resolution is adopted, such shares shall thereafter have the voting rights they would have
had in the absence of this article.
B. To be adopted under this section, the resolution shall be approved by a majority
of all votes which could be cast m a vote on the election of directors by all the outstanding shares other than interested shares. Interested shares shall not be entitled to vote
on the matter, and in determning whether a quorum exists, all interested shares shall be
disregarded. For the purpose of tis subsection, the interested shares shall be determined
as of the record date for determining the shareholders entitled to vote at the meeting.
C. If no resolution is adopted under tis section m respect of shares acquired in
a control share acquisition and beneficial ownership of such shares is subsequently transferred in circumstances where the transferor no longer has beneficial ownership of such
shares and the transferee is not engaged in a control share acquisition, then such shares
shall thereafter have the voting rights they would have had in the absence of this article.
Id. § 13.1-728.3. According to one commentator, the statute adds to "the arsenal of antitakeover weapons available to Virginia corporations." Donald E. King, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Business and CorporateLav, 23 U. RICH. L. REv 491, 503 (1989).
WIR stockholders demonstrated this statute's power when they "overwhelrmngly" voted
against allowing Tyson to vote its shares at a special shareholders meeting in May 1994.
Murphey, supra note 14, at 13. During the meeting, numerous WLR employees and growers
urged one another to reject Tyson's request. Matt Siegel, Tyson's Rooster, CORP COUNS.
MAG., Fall 1994, at 53. Tyson's General Counsel Jim Blair recalled, "It was pretty funny. It
was like being, you know, the only whore in church at a Baptist revival meeting." Id. The
crucial bloc of voters comprised the 13% of WLR stock owned by the company's officers and
directors and another one-tird to one-fourth held by Virginia poultry growers. Id.
110. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -727.1 (Micie 1993). The Affiliated Transactions
Act prohibits the following transactions between a corporation and an interested shareholder for
three years without shareholder approval:
1. Any merger of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries with any interested
shareholder or with any other corporation that immediately after the merger would be an
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and the Poison Pill Statute."' The fourth, the Business Judgment Statute,
affiliate of an interested shareholder that was an interested shareholder immediately before the merger;
2. Any share exchange pursuant to §13.1-717 m which any interested shareholder
acquires one or more classes or series of voting shares of the corporation or any of its
subsidiaries;
3. Except for transactions in the ordinary course of business, (i) any sale, lease,
exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other disposition
to or with any interested
shareholder of any assets of the corporation or of any of its subsidiaries
., or (ii) any
guaranty by the corporation or any of its subsidiaries
of indebtedness of any interested shareholder in an amount in excess of five percent of the corporation's consolidated
net worth
4. The sale or other disposition by the corporation or any of its subsidiaries to an
interested shareholder
of any voting shares of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries
except pursuant to a share dividend or the exercise of rights or warrants
distributed or offered on a basis affording substantially proportionate treatment to all
holders of the same class or series of voting shares;
5. The dissolution of the corporation if proposed by or on behalf of an interested
shareholder; or
6. Any reclassification of securities, including any reverse stock split, or recapitalization of the corporation, or any merger of the corporation with any of its subsidiaries
or any distribution or other transaction, whether or not with or into or otherwise mvolving an interested shareholder, which has the effect, directly or indirectiy
, of increasing by more than five percent the percentage of the outstanding voting shares of the
corporation or any of its subsidiaries beneficially owned by any interested shareholder.
Id. §§ 13.1-725, -725.1. An "interested shareholder" means any person that is "1. The beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation
, or 2. An affiliate or associate of the corporation and at any time within the
preceding three years was an interested shareholder of such corporation." Id. Sections 13.1725.1 and 13.1-726 allow affiliated transactions within three years when the transaction is
approved "by the affirmative vote of a majority (but not less than two) of the disinterested
directors and by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares other than
shares beneficially owned by the interested shareholder," id. § 13.1-725.1, and after three years
when "approved by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares other
than shares beneficially owned by the interested shareholder," id. § 13.1-726. Section 13.1-727
provides a mechamsm for avoiding the shareholder voting requirement if, for example, a
majority of disinterested directors approves the transactions or the interested shareholder meets
certain procedural requirements and sets a fair price.
A main target of this provision is the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer. Stanley
K Joynes, Im & Steven J. Keeler, Virginia's "Affiliated Transactions"Statute: Indulging Form
over Substance in Second Generation Takeover Legislation, 21 U. RICH. L. REv 489, 490
(1987). In this type of offer, the acquiror offers to buy at a premium price only enough shares
to gain control of the target corporation. Id. at 490 n.4. The offeror then merges with the
target corporation and freezes out remaining shareholders by forcing them to accept a lower
price. Id. The act's practical effect, however, is to require either approval by disinterested
shareholders or by disinterested directors or compliance with strict fairness prerequisites before
an offeror can squeeze out minority shareholders. Id. at 497
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646 (Michie 1993). Virginia's Poison Pill Statute provides:
A. Unless reserved to the shareholders m the articles of incorporation and subject
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prescribes a standard for measuring directors' actions in implementing those
measures. 112
to the provisions of § 13.1-651, a corporation may create or issue rights, options or warrants for the purchase of shares of the corporation upon such terms and conditions and
for such consideration, if any, and such purposes as may be approved by the board of
directors.
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A of § 13.1-638, the terms and
conditions of rights, options or warrants created or issued by a corporation may include,
without linutation, restrictions or conditions that preclude or lirmt the exercise, transfer
or receipt thereof by designated persons or classes of persons or that invalidate or void
such rights, options, or warrants held by designated persons or classes of persons. Any
action or determination by the board of directors with respect to the issuance, the terms
and conditions or redemption of rights, options, or warrants shall be subject to the provisions of § 13.1-690 and shall be valid if taken or determined in compliance therewith.
Id. Poison pills have both defensive and offensive uses. Wendy B. Gayle, Note, The Defensive
and Offensive Use of "PoisonPills" Within the Business Judgment Rule, 24 U. RICH. L. REV
127, 132 (1989). If triggered, WLR's defensive poison pill would have allowed all shareholders
except those who had accumulated at least 15% of the shares (i.e., Tyson), to purchase $136
of WLR stock for only $68. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1280.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Michie 1993). Section 13.1-690 prescribes the following general standards of conduct for corporate directors:
A. A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including Is duties as a
member of a comnuttee, in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best
interests of the corporation.
B. Unless he has knowledge or information concerning the matter m question that
makes reliance unwarranted, a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if prepared
or presented by:
1. One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director believes, in good faith, to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
2. Legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the director
believes, in good faith, are within the person's professional or expert competence; or
3. A committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the
director believes, in good faith, that the committee merits confidence.
C. A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take
any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with tis section.
D. A person alleging a violation of this section has the burden of proving the
violation.
Id. Judge Michael interpreted Virginia's Business Judgment Statute as limiting review of
directors' conduct to the "process" by which directors make decisions. WLR Foods, Inc. v
Tyson Foods, Inc., 857 F Supp. 492, 494 (W.D. Va. 1994). Under this construction, the
directors' resort to an informed decision-making process, not the rationality of their ultimate
decision, measures good faith. Id.
Codified director conduct standards are a relatively recent phenomenon. See MODEL
BUSINESS CORP AcT ANN. § 8.30 annotation at 8-172 (3d ed. 1985). They spring from the
common-law duties originally developed by the judiciary. Id. As of 1994, 41 jurisdictions
followed the Model Act pattern of imposing a statutory standard of care on directors. Id. at 8175. Most states measure director conduct in terms of the care "an ordinarily prudent person
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These statutes presented the WLR Foods court, either explicitly or

implicitly, with four main issues: First, do the Virginia statutes form a
scheme under West Lynn Creamery's reasoning?"' Second, should West
14
Lynn Creamery's reasoning encompass nonintegrated statutory schemes?
Third, when does an asserted antitakeover scheme exceed Commerce Clause
validity?. 5 Fourth, what is the proper remedy to an unconstitutional anti-

takeover scheme?" 6 The first two issues relate to whether West Lynn

Creamery's scheme analysis is pertinent to a particular group of challenged
statutes. The second set of issues reveals problems in applying West Lynn
Creamery once a court finds the case apposite. In particular, the issue of

when a scheme surpasses constitutional limits serves as a springboard for
examining a split that has developed in Commerce Clause junsprudence and
for deciding which mode of analysis best provides the answer to whether a
nonintegrated, multistatute antitakeover scheme violates the Commerce
Clause. "'
would exercise under similar circumstances." Id. at 8-176. Virginia stands alone in defining
the director's responsibility as "good faith business judgment as to the best interests of the
corporation." Id. The Virginia standard derives from the court-created business judgment rule.
This rule generally shields management from liability for its decisions and actions. RALPH C.
FERRARA ul AL., TAKEOVERS - ATTACK AND SURVIVAL. A STRATEGIST'S MANUAL 276
(Johnathon E. Richman ed., 1987).
The issue of management's obligations in takeovers has engendered two schools of
thought. Id. at 275-76. Some believe "managerial passivity" during takeovers best serves
shareholder interests. Id. at 274. Others maintain that directors should remain free to thwart
bids they consider contrary to the corporation's best interests. Id. at 275. Delaware courts
resolved the dispute by ruling that directors must take extra steps beyond good faith to ensure
that their decisions are fair and reasonable in takeover situations. See Ress, supra note 14, at
El (describing Delaware's approach to directors' responsibilities in takeovers). Virginia's
antitakeover statutes, however, specifically refer to § 690 as the standard for director conduct
in implementing them. Id. at E3. Virginia thus statutorily breaks with Delaware's common-law
rule requiring extra responsibility. Id. Tyson maintained that, when Virginia's three antitakeover defenses and the "extra kick" of its lement director-conduct law are combined, "there
is simply no way a tender offer can succeed." Id.
113. See WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp 1277, 1281 (W.D. Va.
1994) (addressing Tyson's assertion that Virgima's four separate statutes constitute antitakeover
scheme under West Lynn Creamery).
114. See id. at 1282-83 (discussing problems with extending West Lynn Creamerybeyond
integrated statutory program).
115. See id. at 1286-89 (analyzing constitutionality of Virginia antitakeover laws under
Commerce Clause).
116. See id. at 1282-83 (describing difficulty of structuring remedy for antitakeover
scheme's unconstitutionality).
117 See discussion infra part IV.C (analyzing schism in Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause decisions).
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A. Do Virginia'sFourAntitakeover Statutes Constitute a Scheme?

A necessary first step to declaring Virginia's antitakeover statutes
unconstitutional was finding a scheme. Absent this finding, the WLR Foods
court could probably have easily upheld the individual Virginia statutes. 18

Regarding Virginia's Control Share Act, the Supreme Court in CTS validated a control share statute closely resembling Virginia's."

9

All courts con-

sidering the constitutionality of affiliated transactions statutes have also upheld them. ° Neither have courts invalidated poison pill statutes.,' Finally,
the Business Judgment Statute merely codifies Virginia's standards for reviewing director conduct, again arguably a traditional area of statutory regulation of internal corporate affairs that should not in itself raise Commerce

118. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (supporting constitutionality of Virginia
statutes).
119. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987); see also infra
note 134 (comparing Indiana and Virginia control share statutes).
120. See WLR Memorandum, supra note 106, at 3-4 (citing Amanda Acquisition Corp.
v Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989); West
Point-Pepperell v Farley, Inc., 711 F Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ga. 1989); RP Acquisition Corp. v.
Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988); BNS, Inc. v Koppers Co., 683 F
Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988)). But cf. Topper Acquisition Corp. v Emhart Corp., No. CIV.A.8900110-R, 1989 WL 513034, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 1989) (expressing "some reservations"
about constitutionality of Virginia's affiliated transactions statute). In Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v Universal Foods Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the Commerce Clause validity of a Wisconsin law that required a tender offeror to wait
three years to merge with the target corporation or acquire more than 5% of its assets unless the
target's board of directors agrees to the transaction in advance. Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d
at 509. In its opinion by Judge Easterbrook, the court questioned the economic wisdom of the
statute by stating that "[i]f our views of the wisdom of state law mattered, Wisconsin's takeover
statute would not survive." Id. at 500. The Seventh Circuit nevertheless reasoned that Wisconsin's facially neutral statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce, id. at 506, and that
a state with the power to forbid mergers also has the power to defer them, id. at 508-09.
121. In the companion case to CTS,Judge Posner described as "frivolous" the petitioner's
argument that Indiana's poison pill violated the Commerce Clause. Dynamics Corp. of Am.
v CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 718 (7th Cir. 1986). Judge Posner characterized the statute as
a private contract, which the Commerce Clause does not require states to outlaw Id. One
commentator writes that the "pnvate" nature of poison pills has defused constitutional challenges
inthe past. P John Kozyns, CorporateTakeovers at the JunsdictionalCrossroads:Preserving
State Authority over Internal Affairs While Protecting the Transferability of Interstate Stock
ThroughFederalLaw, 36 UCLA L. REV 1109, 1126 n.59 (1989). The commentator also cites
Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated
in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987), and Moran v Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1353 (Del. 1985), to support his proposition. Kozyns, supra, at 1126 n.59. WLR similarly
argued that poison pills regulate only internal corporate affairs and hence involve no state action
subject to constitutional challenge. WLR Memorandum, supra note 106, at 37
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Clause issues.in Thus, like the separate tax and subsidy components of West
Lynn Creamery's pricing order, the WLR Foods court was unlikely to conclude that the individual Virginia statutes violate the Commerce Clause.
Tyson accordingly needed West Lynn Creamery's scheme approach,
which initially required that Tyson demonstrate a nexus among the four Vir-

ginia laws. Tyson did so by arguing that the facially independent statutes
work in practical effect to render the hostile acquisition of a Virginia corporation difficult or impossible." WLR rejoined that other courts considering
challenges to similar statutes had never grouped the statutes together for constitutional analysis. 24 WLR stated further that the statutes address separate

aspects of corporate affairs."2
Just because the Virgina statutes perform distinct functions, however,

does not mean that they could not all play roles in defeating an attempted
hostile takeover. The first three Virginia statutes increase either the amount

of time or money required to complete an acquisition, while the fourth's lax
standard grants a target corporation's directors broad discretion to implement
these provisions."2 A court, therefore, could properly group the four Vir122. WLR Memorandum, supra note 106, at 37, 40.
123. See Counterclaim-Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum on Constitutional Issues
Raised in its Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5-6, 30, WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods,
Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277 (W.D. Va. 1994) (No. 94-012-H) [hereinafter Tyson Memorandum]
(identifying statutes implicated in scheme and stating that they accomplish effective ban on
hostile tender offers for Virginia corporations).
124. WLR Memorandum, supra note 106, at 44. WLR cited several illustrative cases.
Id. at 44-45 (citing Amanda Acquisition Corp. v Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 498
n.1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989) (noting that Wisconsin's control share
statute was "not pertinent" to constitutional analysis of Wisconsin's control share statute);
Realty Acquisition Corp. v Property Trust of Am., No. J1-89-2503, 1989 WL 214477, at
*4-6 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 1989) (separately analyzing constitutional validity of Maryland's
business combination and control share statutes); BNS, Inc. v Koppers Co., 683 F Supp.
458, 464-76 (D. Del. 1988)- (separately addressing constitutional validity of Delaware's
shareholder rights plan and affiliated transactions statute)).
125. WLR Memorandum, supra note 106, at 42-43. WLR characterized the Control
Share Act as regulating voting rights of a potentially large shareholder, the Affiliated Transactions Act as protecting shareholders against unfairly priced freeze-out transactions, the
Poison Pill Statute as regulating terms of securities issued by Virginia corporations, and the
Business Judgment Statute as a standard of review for director conduct not only in tender
offers but in all situations. Id.
126. The Control Share and Affiliated Transaction Acts may prolong the time before a
tender offeror can either exercise its voting rights or begin the transactions necessary for
merger. The Poison Pill Statute dilutes the value of the tender offeror's acquired stock and
forces the bidder to purchase even more shares before it can acquire control of the target corporation. Judge Michael's interpretation of Virginia's Business Judgment Statute prompted
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gmia statutes as a scheme m practical effect.
B. Should West Lynn Creamery Encompass Nonintegrated
Statutory Schemes?
Even with the statutes' functional interrelation established, Tyson still
sought a substantial extension of West Lynn Creamery because the WLR
Foods scheme differed in one key respect: The Virginia statutes were not

integrated. By contrast, the Massachusetts scheme was intentionally inte-

grated; 27 the pricing order depended on the milk tax to fund the dairy
subsidy "2 None of Virginia's antitakeover statutes, however, depends on
any other for its existence; indeed, the Virginia legislature adopted the laws
to fulfill facially distinct roles. 29 For the West Lynn Creamery holding to
apply in a situation such as WLR Foods, the decision must extend beyond the
West Lynn Creamery facts."S The basis for making such a leap lies m West
Lynn Creamery's functionalist approach to Commerce Clause issues. If

function, or effect, is paramount, the labels "nonintentional" and "nonmtegrated" are irrelevant to save a putative statutory scheme if it operates unconstitutionally 131
one commentator to query, "Do we want a standard of [corporate board of directors'] conduct
to be so low as subjective good faith, and if it is, should we reduce the standard of review so
that there's no substantive review of decisions?" Ress, supra note 14, at E3 (quoting
Professor Leslie Kelleher). Another commented, "Delaware is going to get out-Delawared
by Virginia." Id. at El (quoting Professor Lyman Johnson).
127 WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1282 (W.D. Va.
1994).
128. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2215 (1994) (refusing
to "divorce" and analyze separately "two parts of an integrated regulation").
129. See supra note 125 (describing distinct roles of statutes implicated in Virginia's
antitakeover scheme); cf. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1282 (stating that Virginia's antitakeover statutes have separate, constitutional applications).
130. See WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1282 (stating that West-Lynn Creamery is not
directly on point).
131. But see Regan, supra note 3, at 1125-43 (defining protectionism and reasoning that
only protectionist purpose, not effect, should lead to unconstitutionality). Regan identifies
three features of classical protectionism: explicitness, effect, and purpose. Id. at 1126.
Regan claims that protectionist purpose is the most centrally relevant feature in connection
with the three objections to state protectionism. Id., see supra note 3 (describing Regan's
concept-of-union, resentment/retaliation, and efficiency objections to protectionism). Regan
defines a law as having a protectionist purpose "if it was adopted for the purpose of
improving the competitive position of local economic actors, just because they are local, visa-vis their foreign competitors." Regan, supra note 3, at 1138. "Purpose" includes both
ultimate and intermediate purposes because excluding laws with merely an intermediate
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Assuming West Lynn Creamery's rationale extends to nonmtegrated
schemes (as Judge Michael assumed m his memorandum opinion in WLR
Foods), courts dealing with antitakeover defenses invoking multiple
statutes will face a myriad of difficulties. These courts must first separate
the constitutionality of the independent statutes from the constitutionality of
the overall schemes m which the statutes play roles. For example, the CTS

Court held the individual Indiana control share law constitutional."' One
would accordingly assume that Virginia's Control Share Act, which operates

nearly identically to its Indiana counterpart,'M is equally constitutional. At
some point, however, if a corporation uses the Virginia Control Share Act

m conjunction with a sufficient number of other statutes, West Lynn Creamery's rationale would hold that the use crosses the boundary of constitutional
acceptability Yet if used alone, the Control Share Act would remain per-

fectly lawful.
This conflict highlights a key practical difficulty in extending West Lynn
Creamery to encompass nonmtegrated schemes. The West Lynn Creamery
Court could strike down both regulations because without each other they
served no purpose.3 5 All four statutes implicated in WLR Foods, however,
serve independent purposes apart from any conjunctive use. 36 Courts deal-

ing with alleged statutory schemes resembling the pattern in WLR Foods
would accordingly face the application problems that Judge Michael raised

in his WLR Foods opmion.' 37 These questions fall into two main categories
protectionist purpose would create too many defenses. Id. at 1138-39 (illustrating distinction
between ultimate and intermediate purposes by describing going to grocery to buy bread
(intermediate purpose) in order to have toast for breakfast (ultimate purpose)). Regan then
argues that courts should strike down a state law "if and only if it finds by a preponderance
of the evidence that a protectionist purpose on the part of the legislators contributed
substantially to the adoption of the law or any feature of the law." Id. at 1148.
132. WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1283 (W.D. Va.
1994).
133. CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
134. Both the Indiana and Virginia control share statutes require shareholder approval
before a tender offeror holding shares that would bring its voting power to either onefifth, one-third, or one-half of a target corporation's outstanding voting rights could exercise those rights. Compare IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (1995) (setting forth control
share acquisition legislation) with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Michle 1993)

(same).
135.
intended
136.
laws).
137

C. WLR Foods, 861.F Supp. at 1282 (stating that Massachusetts legislature never
either statute to stand alone).
See supra note 125 (enumerating distinct functions of Virginia's four antitakeover
See WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1282-83 (W.D.
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of concern: First, how do courts determine the point at which the scheme
steps beyond validity 9 Second, how do courts remedy the situation?
C. The PnmaryApplication Problem: When Does an Antitakeover
Scheme Step Beyond Commerce Clause Validity ?
The WLR Foods outcome was not inevitable; current Commerce Clause
jurisprudence does not necessarily secure the Virginia antitakeover scheme's
constitutionality 138 Individual antitakeover statutes fit uncomfortably within

current modes of Commerce Clause analysis.139 West Lynn Creamery only
exacerbates the problem by authorizing courts to examine the effects of
multistatute schemes. 1" As antitakeover schemes (as opposed to single
statutes) grow increasingly effective at rebuffing takeover bids,141 the dissonance between past Commerce Clause cases involving antitakeover laws
and more recent cases involving other types of commodities mtensifies. 42
This incompatibility forms a critical doctrinal impasse, an impasse lurking
beneath Judge Michael's opinion in WLR Foods. Trying to evaluate Virginia's antitakeover scheme under current methods of Commerce Clause
analysis helps one understand the predicament more fully

In Commerce Clause cases generally, courts must first identify the
regulated commodity and then determine whether the regulation improperly
affects interstate commerce. 43 In antitakeover cases, the regulated com-

modity is more than just individual shares of stock. Rather, tender offerors
Va. 1994) (describing "enormous difficulties" that extending West Lynn Creamery would
create for district courts).
138. See infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text and note 195 (arguing that court
could potentially find Virginia antitakeover scheme unconstitutional under current modes of
Commerce Clause analysis).
139 See infra text accompanying notes 198-201 (describing schism between CTS and
recent Commerce Clause decisions).
140. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2209 (1994) (holding
that Massachusetts milk pricing order consisting of conjoined regulations unconstitutionally
discriminates against interstate commerce).
141. See Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 33 (claiming that Virginia antitakeover
scheme's burden on interstate commerce greatly exceeds that of single statute upheld in CTS).
142. See discussion infra part IV.C.3 (describing increasing conflicts m Commerce
Clause jurisprudence).
143. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1681, 1682
(1994) (confirming at outset that local ordinance regulates interstate commerce and describing
regulated article of commerce as service of processing and disposing of solid waste); Edgar
v MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1984) (determining that Illinois act at issue regulated
interstate commerce).
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seek sufficient shares to gain control of a target corporation. 44 In other
words, the commodity desired is "corporate control. '1 45 Courts do not doubt
that state antitakeover laws influence the interstate market for corporate control.i1 The issue then becomes whether a particular scheme's effect violates
the Commerce Clause.
Current forms of antitakeover regulation may violate the Commerce
Clause in two ways. 47 First, they can discriminate, either on their face or
144. Cf. Daniel R. Fisehel, Efficient CapitalMarket Theory, the Marketfor Corporate
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TiEx. L. REv 1, 5-6 (1978) (descri'big methods for shifting corporate control). Tender offers are only one of three methods
for acquiring control of a corporation. Id. The other two are buying shares either through
negotiation with large individual shareholders or on the open market. Id. Fischel claims that
a tender offer is the best way to acquire control if shares are widely held, especially because
buying shares on the open market requires disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission and because such disclosure drives up prices. Id. at 6.
145. Cf. CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (identifying
markets for securities and corporate control as areas of commerce affected by Indiana control
share statute).
146. WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1287 (W.D. Va.
1994). "In fact," stated Judge Michael in WLR Foods, "this principle was so obvious to the
Supreme Court in CTS that it did not bother to say so; it simply considered whether the
statute at issue violated the Commerce Clause." Id. (citing CTS, 481 U.S. at 87). Tyson
argued that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided authority for the proposition that
securities transactions like those in WLR Foods "constitute an important part of the current
of interstate commerce
and directly affect and influence the volume of interstate
commerce." Tyson Memorandum, supra.note 123, at 26 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b(1)
(1988)). Tyson additionally insisted that even shares exchanged exclusively between Virginia
residents flow through interstate commerce because the exchanges are effected by means of
interstate commerce. Id. at 27
147 This discussion assumes that the antitakeover statutes at issue apply only to corporations incorporated m the regulating state. These statutes are the type upheld in CTS. See
CTS, 481 U.S. at 88-89 (concluding that Indiana control share statute, applying only to
Indiana corporations, posed no impermissible threat of regulation). Legislation purporting
to affect corporations incorporated in other states raise different questions. See Pinto, supra
note 67, at 755-56 (pointing to issues of inconsistent regulation and of validity of regulating
internal affairs of foreign corporations that arise when state of incorporation is not used as
nexus for regulating tender offers). Such laws can exceed Commerce Clause validity See
Tyson Foods, Inc. v.McReynolds, 700 F Supp. 906, 910-14 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aft'd, 865
F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989) (striking down Tennessee statutes that allowed non-Tennessee
corporations to mvoke benefits of state's antitakeover laws). The Tyson Foods court carefully
limited its holding and analysis only to the case at hand; it did not pass judgment on the
statutes as applied to Tennessee corporations. Id. at 910. In reaching its conclusion, the
court reasoned that the Tennessee laws improperly attempted to regulate directly offers for
non-Tennessee corporations, id. at 910; created a risk of inconsistent regulation, id. at 91012; and unposed excessive burdens on interstate commerce in relation to local interests served
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in practical effect, without justification by a valid purpose unrelated to economic protectionism. 14 Second, nondiscriminatory regulations can impose

a burden on interstate commerce that exceeds their legitimate local benefits. 149 In WLR Foods, Judge Michael concluded that the Virginia statutes
satisfy both standards of constitutionality " The legitimacy of Virginia's
statutory scheme, however, is actually a closer question than the WLR Foods
decision indicates.
1. The Dlscnmnatory Effect Argument
The first attack on the Virginia antitakeover laws relied on a line of

cases culminating in C & A Carbone, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown.5' Under
by the statute, id. at 912-14. A more detailed examination of state antitakeover laws governing nonstate corporations is beyond the scope of this Note.
This discussion also assumes that current antitakeover laws do not regulate commerce
directly Such regulations are per se invalid. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v New
York State Liquor Author., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (stating that Court strikes down such
regulations without further inquiry). Brown-Formanpresents a classic case of direct regulation. The regulation implicated required any distiller or agent selling alcoholic beverages to
New York wholesalers to affirm that its price for a particular item is no higher than the
lowest price at which the same item would be sold to any other wholesaler m the country
Id. at 575-76. The Court reasoned that the practical effect of New York's affirmation law
was to control liquor prices in other states. Id. at 583. The Court, therefore, concluded that
the law violated the Commerce Clause because New York "'project[ed]' its legislation into
other States,
and directly regulated commerce therein." Id. at 584 (alteration in
original).
The MITE plurality held the Illinois takeover statute invalid because the law purported
to regulate directly MITE, 457 U.S. at 643. The CTS Court did not apply the "direct regulation" prong of Commerce Clause analysis to Indiana's second-generation-style takeover
regulation beyond citing Brown-Formanfor the proposition that statutes subjecting activities
to inconsistent regulations are invalid. CTS, 481 U.S. at 88. But see id. at 97 (White, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Indiana act substantially burdens market for corporate control and
therefore directly inhibits interstate commerce). One would accordingly assume that most
post-MTE takeover legislation, which follows the CTS mold, does not directly regulate
interstate commerce.
148. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1287 (citing C & A Carbone, Inc. v Town of
Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682 (1994)).
149. Id. (citing Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
150. Id. at 1289.
151. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994). See generally Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (invalidating statute prohibiting landfill
operators from accepting solid waste generated outside of county because of statute's protectionist nature); Dean Milk Co. v Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidating ordinance that
made it unlawful to sell milk as pasteurized unless it was processed within five miles of city
because ordinance protected local industry from any competition from out of state); Brimmer
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these cases, regulations discriminate when they hoard a local resource for the
benefit of local businesses by preventing all attempts at acquiring a
commodity located in the state.152 The geographic origin of the thwarted
attempt does not matter.13 Virginia's antitakeover statutes arguably discrm-

mate by umpermssibly hoarding the resource of control of Virginia corporations for the benefit of local business interests.l" The only way to save such
discriminatory statutes is justification by a purpose unrelated to economic

protectionism.
"The

WLR Foods court had little difficulty finding Virginia's
statutory
scheme nondiscriminatory Judge Michael concluded that the antitakeover
laws pass discrimination standards partly because they do not completely

v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) (invalidating Virginia statute imposing special inspection fees
on meat from animals slaughtered more than 100 miles from place of sale because statute
effectively prevented sale of meat from animals slaughtered in distant states).
152. C & A Carbone, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682-83 (1994).
In Carbone,the Supreme Court considered whether a local "flow control ordinance" violated
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1680. The ordinance required all solid waste to be processed
at a designated transfer station before leaving the town. Id. In reviewing the ordinance, the
Court first confirmed that the regulation affected interstate commerce in practical effect
because it drove up the cost for out-of-state interests to dispose of their solid waste and
because it deprived out-of-state businesses of access to the local market in solid waste. Id.
at 1681. The Court next examined the ordinance under the discrimination prong of Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 1682. The Court found that the ordinance discriminated
against interstate commerce because it favored the local waste transfer station over other
operators. Id. The Court then searched for a legitimate interest served by the discriminatory
ordinance to save it from per se unconstitutionality Id. at 1683. The Court, however, found
that the town had numerous nondiscriminatory alternatives for remedying the health and
environmental problems allegedly justifying the flow control ordinance. Id. Accordingly,
the majority concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Id. at 1684.
In her concurring opinon in Carbone, Justice O'Connor asserted that the ordinance did
not discriminate because it lacked the key feature of discrimination on the basis of geographic
origin. Id. at 1688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, the ordinance did not prefer local interests over out-of-town economic interests and thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Id.-at 1689. Justice O'Connor instead concurred with
the majority on the basis of a Pike balancing analysis. Id. at 1691. Justice Souter, with
whom Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun joined, also rejected the majority's discrimination
analysis. See id. at 1692 (Souter, J-, dissenting) (stating that majority invokes "well-settled"
Commerce Clause principles to strike down ordinance unlike anything that Court has ever
invalidated). The dissent also declared that the Commerce Clause did not call upon the Court
"to judge the ultimate wisdom of creating this local monopoly " Id. at 1694.
153. See id. at 1682 (stating that ordinance is no less discriminatory because it also
covers in-state attempts).
154. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp.1277, 1287 (W.D. Va. 1994);
Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 30.
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eliminate interstate commerce in the corporate control market, unlike the
regulations in the Carbone line of cases. 55 He stated that tender offerors
making adequate bids could still acquire Virginia corporations.' 56 The Virginia statutes just render the procurement more expensive. 157 Judge
Michael stated furthermore that under CTS no discrinmnation occurs when
statutes treat similarly situated entities similarly 158 Judge Michael reasoned
that because the Virginia antitakeover scheme favors neither rn-state nor
out-of-state tender offerors, the statutes place everyone on equal footing in
attempting to gain control of Virginia corporations.159 The Virginia statutes
thus treat similarly situated entities similarly, again unlike the regulations

in the Carbone line of cases."6 The WLR Foods court accordingly concluded that Virginia's scheme does not discriminate.
Despite the WLR Foods court's conclusion, however, the Virginia antitakeover laws' nondiscriminatory nature is less than certain under the
recent Commerce Clause cases. The scheme clearly does not facially discrimnate against interstate commerce. 161 Nevertheless, the laws could

155. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1287-88.
156. Id. at 1288.
157 Id. Judge Michael cited Louisville & Nashville R.R. v Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677,
701-04 (1896), to support the proposition that states could ban mergers completely without
violating the Commerce Clause. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1289. Louisville & Nashville
involved a state constitutional provision that forbade consolidation of parallel and competing
railway lines. Louisville & Nashville, 161 U.S. at 679 The Court reasoned that nearly all
railways in the country had been constructed under state authority and that such power necessarily involves power to regulate operations in the public interest. Id. at 702. The Court
furthermore appealed to "a large number of cases" that directly upheld the prohibition against
mergers. Id. at 703. The only other modem case that has cited Louisville & Nashville in the
takeover regulation area is Amanda Acquisition Corp. v Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d
496, 506 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
158. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1288 (citing CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987)).
159. Id.
160. Id. The WLR Foods court stated that in Carbone, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994), one
transfer station could separate waste, but others could not. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at
1288. In Fort Gratiot,502 U.S. 1024 (1992), some solid waste producers could dump their
waste, but other could not. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1288. In Bnmmer, 138 U.S. 78
(1891), some dealers could sell their meat without a special fee, but others could not. WLR
Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1288.
161. Nothing in the Virginia antitakeover scheme prevents target corporations from using
the statutes equally against in-state or out-of-state tender offerors. See supra text accompanying note 159 (reciting WLR Foods court's reasoning that Virginia statutes treat all tender
offerors alike).
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discriminate m practical effect if, contrary to the position of the WLR Foods
court, 62 the scheme causes a complete ban on commerce for control of Virginia corporations. The increased expense of acquiring Virginia corporations under the scheme may erect just as effective a barrier against successful takeovers as the regulations in the Carbone line of cases.' 63 The result
is precisely the same "hoarding" of a local resource that the CarboneCourt
decried."6 The WLR Foods court instead seemed to assume, without substantiation, that any added expense would not have so drastic an effect.' 65
West Lynn Creamery provides yet another avenue for finding the Virginia statutes indirectly discriminatory The West Lynn Creamery Court
found the Massachusetts pricing order to be discriminatory, even though
the tax component considered alone affected in-state and out-of-state milk
producers equally 166 The pricing order's danger lay in its removal of safeguards against legislative abuse because the order's subsidy component
mollified the in-state group that would otherwise have lobbied against the
nondiscrimnatory milk tax.167 The effect was discriminatory because the
pricing order operated to return to the in-state producers as much as (or
more than) the order took away 168 Similarly, Virginia's antitakeover statutes treat out-of-state and in-state tender offerors alike. 69 The in-state corporations, however, also enjoy the benefits of the statutes' protection
should they become targets of a takeover bid. They are in this sense not in
identical positions with out-of-state corporations. Under West Lynn Creamery's reasoning, the protected in-state corporations will not lobby the
Virginia General Assembly to change the laws even if they do not wish to
be hampered in trying to acquire other Virginia corporations, thereby
leaving the West Lynn Creamery Court's concerns about legislative abuse
162. See supra text accompanying note 156 (asserting that tender offerors can still acquire Virginia corporations).
163. Virgima's Business Judgment Statute provides an alternative barrier argument. See
supra note 112 (describing contention that Business Judgment Statute provides "extra kick"
rendering hostile acquisition of Virginia corporations impossible).
164. Cf. C &A Carbone Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682-83 (1994)
(stating that hoarding of local resource constitutes discrimination).
165. See supra text accompanying note 156 (asserting that tender offerors can still
acquire Virginia corporations).
166. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205,'2214-16 (1994).
167 Id. at 2215.
168. Id. at 2212.
169. See supra text accompanying note 159 (maintaining that tender offerors stand on
equal footing in attempting to acquire Virginia corporations).
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unassuaged. In-state and out-of-state corporations thus stand on unequal

footing from a holistic perspective.
If the Virginia scheme is indeed discnminatory, only justification by
a purpose unrelated to economic protectionism can save it from invalidity 170 One can hardly argue that antitakeover statutes serve a purpose other
than local protectionism.'

Indeed, the Virginia legislature itself

conclusively established this point.'

The laws stemmed from the

legislature's express desire to protect Virginia public corporations.' 73 The
legislature reasoned that hostile takeovers adversely affect target

corporations and disrupt communities by causing high unemployment and
erosion of the economy and tax base. 74
170. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994)
(stating that discriminatory regulation is per se unconstitutional unless demonstrated under
rigorous scrutiny that proponent has no other means to advance legitimate local interest).
171. See Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 37 (asserting that motive behind Virgina antitakeover scheme was pure economic protectionism). Tyson cited one commentator
on this point as follows:
All recent state takeover statutes share a common purpose: To discourage hostile
takeover attempts by creating obstacles that require approval by target managers,
thereby causing delay, uncertainty, and increased costs. Many of these laws use
the rhetoric of shareholder welfare, but their primary goal is to protect nonshareholder interests thought to be affected adversely by hostile takeovers.
Id. at 36 (quoting Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciaryand the Meaning of Corporate
Life and CorporateLaw, 68 TEx. L. REv 865, 909 (1990) (footnotes omitted)).
172. See infra note 174 (setting forth reasons why Virginia desired study of hostile takeovers).
173. Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 32; see H.J. Res. 139, Reg. Sess., 1988
VA. ACTS 2180 (providing reasons for requesting State Corporation Commission to study
hostile corporate takeovers in Virginia).
174. H.J. Res. 139, supra note 173, at 2180. The legislative resolution resembles
provisions passed by other states in similar situations and reads as follows:
WHEREAS, corporations are a major contributor to Virginia's economy as
they pay a significant amount of taxes, provide employment to a large number of
citizens, and contribute to community projects; and
WHEREAS, in recent years increased activity in regards to hostile corporate
takeovers has adversely affected corporations throughout the United States,
including some in Virginia; and
WHEREAS, such activity can be highly disruptive to communities by
causing, among other things, high unemployment and erosion of the economy and
the tax base; and
WHEREAS, several states have enacted and many more are considering
legislation that will block hostile corporate takeovers that they fear will cost them
jobs and revenue; and
WHEREAS, in 1985, as part of the revision of the Stock Corporation Act,
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According to Tyson in WLR Foods, these considerations constitute
pure state protectionism, ensuring that Virguua's public corporations will
continue to operate in Virginia with a consistent, even if inefficient, -management. 75 Tyson additionally tried to. distinguish CTS's milder and valid
state protectionism by stating that the Virginia scheme effectively bans any
tender offer to which the target board does not consent, whereas the CTS
statute only slightly delayed tender offers. 76 Tyson claimed that with a discrimnatory effect established WLR bore the burden of showing, under the
strictest scrutiny, that no other means existed to advance a legitimate local
interest, such as protection of health and safety 177
Judge Michael did not reach this argument because he dismissed the
discrimination question at its first stage. Yet even though the WLR Foods
court's ultimate position that the Virgmia scheme is constitutional may be
valid, Carbone and West Lynn Creamery do not firmly mandate this outcome. Other forces were most likely at work in shaping the court's final
decision. An examnation of'these forces follows the17discussion of the
second argument for striking down the Virginia scheme. 1
Virginia enacted provisions designed to discourage certain types of transactions
that involve an actual or threatened change m control of the corporation, but such
provisions may need to be strengthened; and
WHEREAS, Virginia has a vital interest m protecting its citizens,
corporations, and itself from the adverse effects of hostile corporate takeovers;
now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Delegates, the Senate concurring, That the
State Corporation Commission is requested to study hostile corporate takeovers
in Virginia. The State Corporation Commission shall focus its efforts upon, but
not be limited to, a determination of the extent of the problems associated with
corporate takeovers in Virginia and their impact on the Commonwealth's economy, a consideration of what other states and the federal government are doing to
address the problem, and a consideration of possible. legislation to protect
Virginia's corporations and employees from the adverse effects of such takeovers.
Upon completion of this study the State Corporation Commission should
report its findings to the Governor and the 1989 Session of the General Assembly
as provided in procedures of the Division of Legislative Automated Systems for
processing legislative documents.
Id.
175. Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 32; see also Fischel, supra note 144, at
7 (stating that empirical evidence shows that target corporations are poorly managed).
176. Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 33.
177 Id. at 34 (citing C & A Carbone, Inc. v Town of CIarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677,
1683 (1994), and Maine v Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)).
178. See discussion infra part IV.C.3 (examining policy concerns underlying decisions
in antitakeover cases).
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2. The Pike BalancingArgument
Tyson's second argument against the Virginia scheme's validity developed from the balancing test enunciated m Pike v Bruce Church, Inc.'79
Under the Pike test, the Virginia antitakeover statutes violate the Commerce Clause if they impose a burden on interstate commerce that clearly
exceeds their putative local benefits.' With antitakeover laws, the question is not whether they burden interstate commerce, but how much. 81 In
WRE Foods, Tyson pointed to Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions
recogizmg that antitakeover statutes impose significant, direct hardships
on the national economy 182 Tyson argued that the only counterbalancing
concerns were entirely protectiomst. 83 Tyson asserted that these protectionist motives were "evident in WLR's emotional appeals to shareholders
and arguments to this Court as it
repeatedly made an issue of the fact
that an Arkansas corporation should not be allowed to purchase control of
WLR, a Virginia corporation based in the Shenandoah Valley, without
management's consent."'8 4 According to Tyson, "WLR
plainly used
the Virginia Statutory Scheme in the manner the Virginia General Assembly intended, bnnging out parochial 'Valley' interests and purposely 'excit[ing] those jealousies
the Constitution was designed to prevent."" 5
Tyson claimed additionally that its tender offer posed no threat to WLR
shareholders or to WLR as a corporation. ' 6 Tyson reasoned that these
circumstances embody the Virginia scheme's improper purpose, which in
turn produces illegitimate benefits for the local economy 187 Accordingly,
Tyson asserted that the Virginia scheme fails the Pike test because it pro-

179. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). For a discussion of the Pike test's continuing validity, see
supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
180. Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
181. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (asserting that courts do not doubt that
antitakeover laws affect interstate commerce).
182. Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 35 (citing Edgar v MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 643 (1982), and Telvest, Inc. v Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1983)).
183. Id., see also supra notes 173-74 (exploring Virginia's purposes in enacting antitakeover measures).
184. Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 36.
185. Id. (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682
(1994)).
186. See id. at 37 (citing depositions from WLR's own directors to support proposition).
187 Id. (citing Lewis v BT Inv Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43-44 (1980)).
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duces no legitimate local benefits counterbalancing the significant burden
it imposes on interstate commerce.' 88

The WLR Foods court did not overtly reject Tyson's Pike argument.
Rather than focusing on the statutes' protectionist effects, however, Judge
Michael emphasized the Supreme Court's approach to antitakeover statutes
in CTS.'8 9 CTS invoked the internal affairs doctrine to define states'
counterbalancing local interests." 9 According to the CTS Court, a state has
a sufficient interest in defining the attributes of corporations organized
under its laws to justify any burdens on interstate commerce associated with
the Commerce Clause. 9 ' Applying this rationale to WLR Foods, Judge
Michael stated that Virginia merely defines the attributes of its corporations
through its antitakeover scheme:
Based upon the four Virginia statutes, a Virginia corporation is an entity
(1) in which shareholders holding over one-fifth of the shares have no
voting rights absent consent of the directors or the disinterested shareholders (Control Share Act); (2) that cannot be merged into another entity for
three years without consent of its directors (Affiliated Transactions Act);
(3) that can issue discriminatory rights to the detriment of some of its
shareholders, provided that such discrimination is in the best interests of
the corporation (Poison Pill Statute); and (4) whose directors must conduct
themselves based upon their good faith business judgment of the best
interests of the corporation, and who may satisfy this standard by relying
in good faith on competent advice received pursuant to an informational
process undertaken in good faith (Business Judgment Statute). 'I

A state need not define its corporations as other states do; it need only
provide residents and nonresidents equal access to them.

93

Judge Michael

188. Id.
189. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1288 (W.D. Va. 1994).
190. See C'S Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89-93 (1987) (discussing
nature of corporate governance and legitimacy of state actions in regulating it).

191. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1288 (citing CTS, 481 U.S. at 89-92). CTS actually focused on the state's interests m protecting shareholder's rights, but also used language indicating that states' creation of corporations, prescription of corporate powers,
and definition of corporate rights are an "accepted part of the business landscape m this
country " CTS, 481 U.S. at 91. The Supreme Court furthermore emphasized a state's
interest in "promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it
charters." Id. One could read the "parties involved" as including not only the corporation's
shareholders and directors but also its employees, community, and other nonshareholder
interests.
192. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1288-89.
193. CTS, 481 U.S. at 94; WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1289.
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further asserted that the Virginia statutes simply give shareholders and management tools to ensure that takeovers are successful only if consistent with
the corporation's long-term interests. "9 4 By evaluating Virginia's interests
from a different perspective, the WLR Foods court found that the Pike
balances weigh in favor of upholding the Virginia scheme. 95
3. A Developing Schism in Commerce ClauseJurisprudence
The WLR Foods court thus refused to strike down Virginia's antitakeover statutes on either a discrimination or Pike balancing basis. Statutes
must satisfy both tests to be constitutional.' 9 6

The Virginia statutory

scheme's validity under both tests, however, actually presents a close question. 97
' Although Judge Michael's Pike analysis dovetails fairly well with

CTS's analysis, the court's conclusion under the Carbone line of cases
leaves something to be desired.
As Judge Michael noted at the end of his discrimination analysis,
however, CTS does not address the Carbone line of cases. 9

Judge

Michael claimed that this omission amplified the distinction between the
regulations invalidated in those cases and takeover statutes.' 99 CTS would
uphold antitakeover measures that are facially neutral as between in-state
and out-of-state tender offerors, no matter that the statutes' burdens will fall
more often on out-of-state corporations. '° Tins premise indicates a split
194. WLR Foods, 861 F Supp. at 1289.
195. Id. If Judge Michael had focused on protectionist effects, the Pike balancing scales
may have tipped in the opposite direction. CTS invoked shareholder protection as a counterbalancing state interest in addition to the internal affairs doctrine. CTS, 481 U.S. at 91.
By purporting to defend more than shareholder interests, see supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing purposes behind Virginia's antitakeover laws), Virginia's scheme
does not necessarily fall within a narrow reading of CTS. In this respect, the Virginia
statutes could fail to satisfy the Pike balancing test. A broader reading of CTS, however,
might encompass a defense of nonshareholder interests. See supra note 191 (describing
CTS Court's emphasis of state interest surrounding "parties involved" in state's corporations).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74 (setting forth two bases for invalidating
statutes under Commerce Clause).
197 See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text and note 195 (arguing that court
could potentially find Virginia antitakeover scheme unconstitutional under current modes of
Commerce Clause analysis).
198. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1288 n.ll (W.D. Va.
1994).
199 Id.
200. CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
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in Commerce Clause jurisprudence based merely on formal titles. If
labeled as a corporate governance measure, a statute or regulation will be
subject to the less strict facial neutrality standard of CTS, whereas other
types of regulations will be subject to the more functional, indirect
discrimination standards of the Carbone and West Lynn Creamery cdses.2"'
A unified system of analysis would simplify matters, but if antitakeover
measures are truly different creatures from milk pricing orders and solid
waste processing regulations, then the dichotomy is justified. Reconciling
this split was an implicit yet core issue implicated in WLR Foods. The
solution requires a closer examination of the policies underlying courts'
decisions in antitakeover cases.
In analyzing antitakeover laws under the Commerce Clause, courts
become embroiled in a doctrinal controversy over the fundamental role of
corporate law 202 One view holds that corporate law should aim to create

legal structures that maximize shareholder wealth."' Advocates of this
shareholder primacy norm rely on a "'contractanan,' antiregulatory, individualistic stance.""° Conversely, a "commuitarian" view posits that legal
rules should structure relations among the corporation's diverse constituencies, such as the corporation's employees, suppliers, and communities. 0°
201. See supra note 152 and notes 166-68 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination analysis under Carbone and West Lynn Creamery).
202. Cf. David Millon, New Directions in CorporateLaw: Communitanans, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. REv 1373, 1373 (1993)
(detailing ongoing "crisis of uncertainty over corporate law's normative foundations").
203. Id.at 1374.
204. Id. at 1377 Professor Millon writes, "Contractarians start from the presumption that people ought to be free to make their own choices about how to live their lives (subject to an overriding duty not to harm others)." Id. at, 1382. Contractarians would~eschew
state laws that mandate or inhibit particular relationships between participants in corporate
activity (for example, management, shareholders, workers, and creditors) in favor of laws
allowing the parties to specify their rights and obligations through contract. Id. at 1378.
205. Id. at 1378-79. Communitarians presume that "[s]imply by virtue of membership
m a shared community, individuals owe obligations to each other that exist independently of
contract." Id. at 1382. They call for state action to enforce the duties of interdependence,
which necessarily restricts freedom. Id. at 1382-83. The communitarian approach doubts
the efficacy of contract as a means of protecting nonshareholders before damage is done.
Id. at 1379. While many communitarians still share the contractarians' esteem of individual autonomy and choice, they believe that "meaningfuil choice requires a social framework that cannot itself be constructed entirely out of private, bilateral transactions." Id. at
1383.
Interestingly (and perhaps counterintuitively), conservatism fits rather comfortably
within the communltarian position. As Professor Johnson writes, "Traditionally, conserva-
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Communitanans see corporations not as agglomerations of pnvate contracts
but as powerful institutions whose conduct substantially affects the public.' Put simply, contractanans would20 8tend to meet antitakeover laws with
jeers; 207 communitarians with cheers.
Another way to frame the problem facing courts in antitakeover cases
is as a conflict between the dual natures of the corporate form. In one
sense, public corporations, being made up of equity secunties, are pure
tism has meant more than a strong preference for the private sector as a counterpoise to the
public sphere. It has also been keenly protective of institutions such as family, church, and
local communities as vibrant sources of energy and influence." Lyman Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality, Community, and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv 1051,
1055 (1987). Such noneconomic concerns befit communitarians. Johnson further maintains
that today's "preference for the private sphere and the imperative of economics" threatens the
latter component of conservatism. Id. The WLR/Tyson takeover battle epitomized the clash
between community-oriented conservativism and the contractanan approach that exalts the
value of nationwide economic "efficiency" over traditional local institutions.
206. Millon, supra note 202, at 1379.
207 Cf.David Millon, State TakeoverLaws: A Rebirth of CorporationLaw', 45 WASH.
& LEE L. REv 903, 919 (1988) (describing how shareholders lose when hostile takeovers are
deterred). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv L. REv 1161 (1981)
(arguing that antitakeover laws decrease shareholder welfare). In this leading article advocating shareholder primacy, Easterbrook and Fischel assert that tender offers benefit shareholders by providing a premium over market price during the initial bid. Id. at 1173.
Further, the threat of a takeover encourages management to perform efficiently for shareholders. Id. at 1174. The authors later denigrate those who argue that a target corporation's
directors have a duty to consider nonshareholder interests. Id. at 1190. They claim that
takeovers enhance everyone's interests by improving economic efficiency, that incumbent
managers cannot predict whether the new owners' policies will be detrimental to nonshareholder interests, and that consideration of nonshareholder interests rejects the idea that agents
(managers) are accountable to their principals (shareholders). Id. at 1190-91. Interestingly
in CTS, the Supreme Court drew on shareholder primacy theory to uphold an antitakeover
measure. See CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (asserting that
state's interest in protecting shareholders outweighs limited effect of Indiana antitakeover law
on interstate commerce). CTS's focus raises the question of what other interests antitakeover
regulation can protect without violating the Commerce Clause. Pinto, supra note 67, at 724.
208. Cf. Millon, supra note 202, at 1375-76 (describing shifting perceptions of hostile
takeovers' benefits and increasing resistance). The principal assertion contains some exaggeration because antitakeover laws may not present an effective means for satisfying commumtarian concerns. See Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicialand Legislative
Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CoRP L. 35, 86-87 (1988) (positing reasons
for probable failure of current antitakeover legislation in achieving its primary objective of
protecting resident nonshareholder interests). To the extent that takeover legislation reaches
beyond shareholder protection to allow corporate management to consider certain nonshareholder interests, however, communitarians should embrace it.
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commodities." 9 Viewed as such, Commerce Clause challenges to laws
regulating securities are appropriate. The market for this article of commerce has an interstate scope.2 ' Hence, it should remain free of improper
restraints."' In another sense, however, corporate entities are "persons, "212
whose existence and rights depend entirely on state law

213

These corporate

persons may have distinct identities that are stamped by the communities
in which they "reside" and that in turn shape their communities. 1 4 Should
the Constitution not allow state protection of these persons from involuntary
enslavement to the highest bidder? Granted, this characterization is extreme, but it helps illustrate the competing values underlying Commerce
Clause decisions in antitakeover cases.215
209. Cf. CTS, 481 U.S. at 94 (identifying corporation as commodity traded m market
for corporate control).
210. See supra note 146 (describing scope of market for corporate control).
211. See H.P Hood & Sons, Inc. v Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (describing
Founders' vision of open national market). As Justice Jackson wrote:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access
to every market m the Nation
Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
Id.
212. See First Nat'l Bank v Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (finding corporation entitled
to First Amendment's free speech protection); Santa Clara County v Southern Pac. R.R.,
118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (opining that corporation is person entitled to Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection). See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
Development of CorporateTheory, 88 W VA. L. REV 173 (1985) (tracing history of development of natural entity theory of corporation). The natural entity theory views a corporation
as a natural legal person rather than an artificial creation of the state, or a distinct entity
rather than as a "mere aggregation of individuals that ha[s] no separate identity of its own."
Millon, supra note 207, at 916. The entity thus enjoys "all the freedoms enjoyed by other
persons." Id. Although Horowitz posited that this theory legitimated releasing corporations
from traditional regulation of their activities and a new class of managers from shareholder
control, Millon writes that the theory also has a tendency to justify managerial discretion to
use corporate resources for nonshareholder interests even at the shareholders' expense. Id.
at 916-17
213. See CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (stating that
corporation "owes its existence and attributes to state law").
214. Continuing with the "persona" analogy, Michael Halperm and Steven Bell have
written that "[c]orporations often have family trees that are every bit as complicated as human
family trees." MICHAEL HALPERIN & STEVEN J. BELL, RESEARCH GUIDE TO CORPORATE
ACQUISmONS, MERGERS, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURING 124 (1992). The authors state further
that "[a]s corporate genealogists, we are often called on to trace the connections among a
corporation's ancestors and in-laws." Id.
215. C. Johnson & Millon, supra note 104, at 856 (describing trouble with certain Coin-
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Emphasizing the Commerce Clause's primary concern, that of preserving interstate comity, 216 provides a solution to these conflicts. The
merce Clause arguments). Johnson and Millon express concerns about arguments "that the
dormant commerce clause prevents the states from protecting resident nonshareholders at the
expense of nonresident shareholders - that capital markets are quintessentially interstate
commerce and the interests of those (shareholders) who participate in those markets are
constitutionally preferred over those who deal locally with corporations in other ways." Id.
The authors suggest that assuming states continue to restrict takeovers, resolution of this
doctrinal question will determine the ultimate success or failure of state efforts. Id.
Professor Johnson has claimed that state takeover statutes raise the question of whether
the entire corporate industry ought to operate within operate within "a narrow and rigid
conception of corporate endeavor" that elevates "unfettered capital markets" or whether
"some actors are entitled to say 'no' and begin
to rechart a different course." Johnson,
supra note 205, at 1057 He observes that courts and legislatures appear to differ on the basic
issue of whose interests they should seek to protect. Johnson, supra note 208, at 38. He
posits that while courts are using external capital markets to protect shareholders, states are
using internal corporate governance mechanisms to protect noninvestors. Id. at 39.
According to Johnson, state preference of resident nonmvestor interests over nonresident
shareholders makes sense from the states' political and economic perspectives because
residents are the constituents who vote and directly contribute to the states' economies.
Johnson, supra note 205, at 1054. In denigrating the validity of Pike balancing, Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion in CTS doubted (somewhat sarcastically) the Court's ability to
make normative judgments regarding corporations:
[A]n inquiry [under the Pike balancing test] isill suited to the judicial function and
Nothing in the Constitution says that the
should be undertaken rarely if at all.
protection of entrenched management is any less important a "putative local
benefit" than the protection of entrenched shareholders, and I do not know what
qualifies us to make that judgment - or the related judgment as to how effective
the present statute is in achieving one or the other objective - or the ultimate (and
most ineffable) judgment as to whether, given importance-level x, and
effectiveness-level y, the worth of the statute is "outweighed" by impact-oncommerce z.
CTS,481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
216. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing "important doctrinal theme" in Commerce Clause jurisprudence). Professor Tribe
writes:
[T]he negative implications of the commerce clause derive principally from a
political theory of union, not from an economic theory of free trade.
Although the Court's commerce clause opinions have often employed the language
of economics, the decisions have not interpreted the Constitution as establishing
the inviolability of the free market.
Id., see also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2219 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that Court has never held that every state law obstructing national market
violates Commerce Clause). Justice Scalia expressed concerns over the majority's opinion
in West Lynn Creamery, which he felt "canvassed the entire corpus of negative-CommerceClause opinions, culled out every free-market snippet of reasoning, and melded them into the
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Commerce Clause permits some protectionism.2" 7 If a state's protection of

its corporations does not threaten interstate comity as much as protectionism in other areas, antitakeover laws should withstand constitutional
scrutiny
A conciliatory approach proceeds from the premise that corporations
are extraordinary units of economic activity State law creates and regulates most aspects of these commodities/legal persons. Far-reaching policy
issues surround these creations. Under such unusual circumstances, stateassisted isolation presents a lesser threat to the federal union than does protection of other, more ordinary articles of commerce that are less dependent

on individual state law A major threat to interstate comty should thus
arise only when antitakeover laws favor one set of similarly situated tender
offerors over another. Unless the laws jeopardize interstate comity in tis
manner, the fact that they may represent unsound economic policy is
relevant only to the decisions of legislatures, not to the decisions of courts.

This reasoning is consonant with policies invoked in both CTS and
WLR Foods. In WLR Foods, for example, Tyson tried to bolster its
arguments with the gloss that Virginia's scheme is not only unconstitutional
but also works bad economic consequences by encouraging the entrenchsweeping principle that the Constitution is violated by any state law or regulation that
'artificially encourag[es] rn-state production even when the same goods could be produced
at lower cost in other States.'" Id. at 2219 (alteration in original).
For an examination of the effectiveness of the Commerce Clause in creating an open
national market, see REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE: PRINCIPAL

PAPERBYEDMUNDW KITCH 7 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1981) (arguing that integrated national
market of United States has not furthered free trade). In his paper, Professor Kitch asserts

that the Supreme Court's decisions in Hughes v Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
(1976), and Exxon Corp. v Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 17 (1978), demonstrate that "a state
bent on local protectionism will not need great ingenuity to evade the Court's [Commerce
Clause] doctrine." Id. at 47 In discussing the Supreme Court's future direction in
interpreting the Commerce Clause, then-Professor Scalia commented that the individuals most
likely to favor increasing free trade are the same people who favor decreasing judicial
activism. Id. at 159.
217 Cf. Regan, supra note 100, at 1872 (contrasting permissible and impermissible
protectionist purposes). As Regan phrases the distinction:

A purpose to protect [in-state] workers and suppliers at the expense of [out-of state
persons] is impermissible, but a statute which was motivated by a general belief that

takeovers leading to corporate removals are unacceptably disruptive of established
economic relations, and which was limited to [in-state] corporations simply because
those were the only corporations the [state] legislature had power to regulate, would
be perfectly permissible so far as the dormant commerce clause is concerned.
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ment of inefficient corporate management.218 The WLR Foods court,
however, declined to factor the economic wisdom of Virgima's antitakeover scheme into its constitutional analysis.2 19 Judge Michael did not hide

the principles behind Ins repudiation of Tyson's argument: reluctance to
interfere with what the court perceived to be a state legislative function.22 0

As Judge Michael stated in his final decision in the WLR case, "All of [the]
rulings [in tis case] share one dominant theme - the court's refusal to
usurp the power of Virginia's legislature." 22' Similarly, the Supreme Court
in CTS recognized the importance of a state's interest m regulating and
defining the attributes of its corporations.2 2 The Court stated that such
activity offends neither Congress nor the Commerce Clause.223
The solution to fitting multistatute antitakeover schemes more comfortably into existing Commerce Clause cases, therefore, begins by
accepting that corporate control is a special commodity Courts should
then test antitakeover laws only under CTS's facial neutrality standard
rather than Carbone and West Lynn Creamery's indirect discrmination
criteria. Finally, courts can weigh the statutes under the Pike balancing test
as traditionally applied, which mandates that courts uphold the laws unless
their burden clearly exceeds their putative local benefits. 4 Any bal218. See Tyson Memorandum, supra note 123, at 38 (alleging that Virginia antitakeover
scheme protects entrenched management by removing incentives to improve performance and
maintain high stock prices).
219. See WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 869 F Supp. 419, 424 (W.D. Va.
1994) (stating that constitutionality of Virginia's antitakeover scheme does not depend on its
economic wisdom). Judge Michael's statements echo Justice Scalia's more biting words in
his concurring opinion m CTS: "As long as a State's corporation law governs only its own
corporations and does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it should survive this
Court's scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, whether it promotes shareholder welfare or
industrial stagnation." CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95-96 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
220. WLR Foods, 869 F Supp. at 424 (declaring that remedy for overly broad antitakeover laws lies not with court but with Virginia legislature because legislature is better
equipped to weigh policy considerations).
221. Id.
222. CTS, 481 U.S. at 94.
223. Id.
224. Pike v Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Pike Court recognized
protection and enhancement of the reputation of Arizona cantaloupe growers (which in turn
maximized financial return to local industry) as a legitimate state interest. Id. at 143. A key
fact inPike, however, was that the regulation would require a company to build an unneeded
$200,000 packing plant in Arizona. Id. at 145. Even though the regulation at issue in Pike
served an arguable - albeit tenuous - legitimate local interest, the Court would not tolerate
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ancing,'z however, should again account for the Commerce Clause's
primary goal of maintaining interstate comity and for the special state
interests surrounding corporations.
D. The Secondary Application Problem: Fashioninga Remedy
for UnconstitutionalAntitakeover Schemes
If the WLR Foods court had found Virgima's antitakeover scheme unconstitutional, it would have faced the most complicated practical issue in
the case: how to remedy the situation. Tyson asked for relief but proposed
no precise solution. Judge Michael wrote that the court could not simply
strike down the offending legislation because, unlike the Massachusetts
pricing order, the Virginia statutes maintain independent applications. 26
A court would instead have to enjoin the particular unconstitutional uses of
those statutes.227 Tius process would force courts to engage in fine, even
arbitrary, line drawing between gradations of constitutionality Courts
would have to ask whether unconstitutionality begins with the first, second,
third, or fourth law, or whether it began with a combination of the first and
third, second and fourth, first and second, and so forth.
The predicament would likely engender inconsistent decisions. Courts
facing such a situation are at least slightly more inclined to search for
avenues of declaring the challenged statutes constitutional than to face the
distasteful alternative. Although these practical considerations would certainly never justify upholding a scheme that is truly unconstitutional, they
nonetheless demonstrate why one should not take West Lynn Creamery's
sweeping dicta strictly at face value.
V Conclusion
Although West Lynn Creamery's reasoning that a sum of statutes may
be more dangerous than its innocuous parts provided an interesting avenue
the significant burden of this particular form of state-mandated inefficiency Id. By contrast,
Virginia's antitakeover laws arguably do not lead to so concrete an example of economic

waste. Their burden on interstate commerce thus should not clearly exceed their local
benefits.
225. If courts followed some authorities' suggestions, they would discard Pike balancing
altogether. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text and note 215 (discussing significance of CTS's failure to invoke expressly Pike balancing and describing Justice Scalia's
disparagement of Supreme Court's ability to make Pikejudgments).
226. WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F Supp. 1277, 1282 (W.D. Va.

1994).
227

Id.
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for attacking antitakeover laws m WLR Foods, it should ultimately fail to
affect takeover litigation seriously Current antitakeover measures should
not run afoul of the Commerce Clause, so long as the schemes on their face
treat similarly situated tender offerors equally and satisfy a Pike balancing
sensitized to the special issues involved.22 This approach leaves undisturbed the proper roles of state legislatures in determining local economic

policy and of the courts in determining constitutionality 229 If a state does
not wish money to be able to buy control of its corporations, West Lynn
Creamery should not prevent it from achieving that result.

Postscnpt

Subsequent to this Note's completion in Spring 1995, the Fourth Circuit handed down an opinion affirmng on every issue the district court's
decision in WLR Foods. Like the district court before it, the Fourth Circuit

assumed without deciding that West Lynn Creamery could apply to unintegrated statutes.23 In addressing Tyson's Commerce Clause arguments, the
Fourth Circuit essentially restated the district court's position. First, the
court concluded that the four Virginia statutes do not discriminate because
they treat m-state and out-of-state tender offers identically and because they
do not hoard a resource since they fail to eliminate completely commerce
" ' Second,
in corporate control.23
the court determined that the burden the

228. See supra note 147 and discussion supra part IV.C.3 (regarding types of antitakeover schemes covered by this Note and prescribing appropriate methodology for evaluating
them under Commerce Clause).
229. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1694 (1994)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that Court is called upon to say whether law at issue violates
Commerce Clause, not to judge law's ultimate wisdom); CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987) (observing that Constitution does not require states to subscribe
to any particular economic theory and that Court is disinclined to "second-guess the empirical
judgments of lawmakers concerning utility of legislation"); id. at 96-97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (declaring that state "law can be both economic folly and constitutional"); Amanda
Acquisition Corp. v Universal Foods Corp, 877 F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir.) (claiming that
"skepticism" about wisdom of state law does not lead to conclusion that law is unconstitutional), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
230. WLR Foods, Inc. v Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 95-1039, slip op. at 7 n.2 (4th Cir.
Sept. 22, 1995).
231. Id. at 13-14.

ANTITAKEOVER "SCHEMES"

1519

statutes impose on interstate commerce is not clearly excessive in relation
to Virginia's legitimate interest in regulating its corporations. 2 Reportedly, an appeal was "almost certain. n233

232. Id. at 14.
233. Randolph Goode, Appellate CourtRejects Tyson Bid, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Sept. 23, 1995, at C1.
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